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RETURNING TO NEW ORLEANS: REFLECTIONS ON
THE POST-KATRINA RECOVERY, DISASTER RELIEF,
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE
Susan L. Waysdorf*
INTRODUCTION

From New Orleans, St. Bernard Parish, and Plaquemines Parish, to Slidell,
Louisiana and all along the Gulf Coast to Biloxi, Mississippi, I have seen things
that I never thought I would see in America: streets emptied of residents; block
after block with only twisted shells of former schools, fire stations and stores; and
the ruins and rubble of thousands of homes. Like millions of Americans, I
watched in horror while the events of August 29, 2005 unfolded, when Hurricane
Katrina slammed into New Orleans and the Gulf Coast as a Category 4 Hurricane.1 Within one day, massive storm surges broke through the levee system sur*

Professor of Law, University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law;

B.A., University of Chicago; J.D., University of Maryland Law School. Professor Waysdorf took a
sabbatical leave from teaching in the Spring 2008 Semester to volunteer at the Pro Bono Project, a
New Orleans non-profit that provides legal assistance to Katrina survivors. She extended this leave
through the Fall 2008 Semester in order to continue this volunteer service. The author dedicates this
Essay to all those who lost their lives in Hurricane Katrina. She gives thanks to all those in New
Orleans who graciously shared their stories of survival, some of which she describes in this Essay. The
author based portions of these narratives on the journal which she wrote about her experiences while
volunteering in post-Katrina New Orleans. Professor Waysdorf extends her appreciation to Rachel
Piercey, Director of the Pro Bono Project, and her dedicated staff for providing her with this invaluable extended volunteer opportunity. She also thanks her colleagues at the Loyola University New
Orleans College of Law clinical program for their fellowship, and particularly Professor Luz Molina,
for her wisdom and inspiration. Finally, the author is, as always, thankful to her partner, Mary K.
O'Melveny, for her support and encouragement. The writing of this Essay was supported in part by a
grant from the David A. Clarke School of Law. Professor Waysdorf delivered a version of this Essay
at the February 29, 2008 UDC/DCSL Law Review Symposium, Katrina's Wake: Emergency Preparedness and Response from the Bayou to the Beltway. The author framed many of the policy positions
contained in this Essay while serving as a member of the Barack Obama Campaign's Urban and
Metropolitan Policy Committee from January 2008 to November 4, 2008.
1 Willie Drye, HurricaneKatrina Smashes Gulf Coast, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHic NEWS, Aug. 29,
2005, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/080829 050829_katrina.html; see also THE
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rounding New Orleans and flooded the city with more than twenty feet of toxic,
sludge-filled water.2 These catastrophic events were followed less than a month
later, on September 24, by Hurricane Rita, which crashed ashore onto the Gulf
Coast spreading chaos and destruction on top of Katrina's fresh devastation. The
two created an unprecedented duo of extreme storms, and their impact will be
felt for decades to come.

Hurricane Katrina, with its gale-force 120-plus mile-per-hour winds, massive
storm surge and floodwaters unleashed by the breached levees, had a deadly and
catastrophic impact on New Orleans in particular. As the National Weather Ser3
vice aptly predicted, Hurricane Katrina-an unprecedented "397 Year Storm"

-

would have an impact on Louisiana and the Gulf Coast that inflicted "human
suffering incredible by modern standards.",4 Over 80% of New Orleans flooded, 5
inundating vast expanses of many neighborhoods. More than 107,000 residences
were flooded, causing most to be totally destroyed.6 Another 27,000 residences in

New Orleans sustained major wind damage, and hundreds of thousands of homes
were destroyed throughout the Gulf Coast region. 7

In the storm's wake, 71% of all housing in New Orleans was destroyed or
seriously damaged, making Katrina and the floods the greatest residential disasWHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE To HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 1 (2006),

available at http://puri.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS67263 [hereinafter LESSONS LEARNED] ("Hurricane
Katrina, its 115-130 mph winds, and the accompanying storm surge it created as high as 27 feet along a
stretch of the Northern Gulf Coast from Mobile, Alabama, to New Orleans, impacted nearly 93,000
square miles of our Nation-roughly an area the size of Great Britain.").
2

SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO KA-

TRINA, 109th Cong., A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 73 (2006), http://katrina.house.gov/fullkatrina-report.
htm [hereinafter A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE].
3 Many Levees Still Not Ready, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2008, at A10 ("Few of New Orleans's
levees would protect the city from a 100-year storm, the kind of hurricane that might have a 1-in-100
chance of occurring in any given year. Hurricane Katrina was a 397-year storm .... ").
4 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 2, at 70 (citing Public Advisory, National Weather
Center (New Orleans, LA), Urgent Weather Message: Devastating Damage Expected (Aug. 28, 2005;
10:11 a.m. CDT)).
5 New Orleans Ready to Evacuate, THE WEATHER CHANNEL, Aug. 28, 2008, http://www.
weather.com/newscenter/topstories/082808-gustav.html. "This storm surge overwhelmed levees all
along the lower reaches of the Mississippi River and the edges of Lake Pontchartrain. The consequences for New Orleans, which sits mostly below sea level, were dire. Significant levee failures occurred on the 17th Street Canal, the Industrial Canal, and the London Avenue Canal. Approximately
80 percent of the city was flooded." LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 1, at 6.
6 THE BROOKINGS INST. METRO. POLICY PROGRAM & GREATER NEW ORLEANS COMMUNITY
DATA CENTER, THE NEW ORLEANS INDEX ANNIVERSARY EDITION: THREE YEARS AFTER KATRINA
17 (2008), available at http://gnocdc.s3.amazonaws.com/NOLAIndex/NOLAIndex.pdf [hereinafter
THREE YEARS AFTER KATRINA].
7 Id.; see also LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 1, at 7 ("Estimates vary but, considering property
damage alone, Hurricane Katrina is America's first disaster-natural or man-made-to approach the
$100 billion mark.... Hurricane Katrina devastated far more residential property than had any other

recent hurricane, completely destroying or making uninhabitable an estimated 300,000 homes.").
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ter in U.S. history. 8 The storm's impact unleashed incredible human suffering by
displacing approximately 1.2 million Gulf Coast residents, predominately poor
and African American-many of whom still have not been able to return home
over three years after the storm. 9 More than 1600 people, mostly African American and many elderly, were killed by the storm-most by drowning in the raging
floodwaters. Others died of starvation and dehydration, having been stranded by
the events on their rooftops. Many elderly and disabled died from the intolerable
conditions at nursing homes and at the Superdome, the city's refuge of last resort.
Other fatalities were caused by bacterial infections contracted from contami10
nated, toxic water.
Thousands of Americans from across the country and from many walks of life
responded to these extreme and catastrophic events and the government's apparent abandonment of Katrina's victims. They heeded the call to volunteer and to
engage in humanitarian assistance. In the wake of Katrina, thousands of Americans saw these tragic events as a challenge to actively engage in national service
in the Gulf Coast. This surge of volunteerism in New Orleans and throughout the
devastated Mississippi Gulf Coast area by thousands of law school, high school,
and college students, along with churches, synagogues, and civic groups from
around the country, created a domestic civic and humanitarian movement that in
many ways had not been seen since the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s.
As a law professor, I responded to these events, in part, by creating a course
on disaster law, Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans, along with two colleagues,
Professors Laurie Morin and Will McLain. We called this new course Katrina &
Beyond: Disaster Prevention and Recovery, Social Justice and Government Accountability. As part of the course, a group of forty students, alumni, and school
8 Id.
9 Officials May Evacuate New Orleansas Gustav Nears, BUSINESS REPORT, Aug. 28, 2008, http:/
/www.businessreport.com/news/2008/aug/28/officials-may-evacuate-new-orleans-gnitl/
("After [Katrina's] destruction, many people never returned, and the city's population, around 310,000 people, is
roughly two-thirds what it was before the storm, though estimates vary wildly."). Estimates of the
number of people evacuated from the region as a result of Hurricane Katrina vary from 700,000 to
more than 1.2 million. THOMAS GABE, GENE FALK, MAGGIE MCCARTY & VIRGINIA W. MASON,
CONGRESS. RESEARCH SERV., HURRICANE KATRINA: SOCIAL-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
IMPACTED AREAS 14 (Nov. 4, 2005); see also Haya El Nasser & Paul Overberg, Katrina Exodus

Reaches All States, USA TODAY, Sept. 28, 2005, at 1A.
10 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 2, at 74 (listing causes of death and indicating that
"approximately 1100 lives in Louisiana" were taken by Katrina). Recent reports conclude that over
1600-perhaps as many as 2000-people lost their lives to Katrina. See, e.g., Adam Nossiter, Two
Million Flee Hurricane'sPath;GOP Cuts Convention Events, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2008, at Al [hereinafter Two Million Flee] (reporting on the historic exodus of 2 million people from the Gulf Coast,
including New Orleans, in the face of Hurricane Gustav three years after Katrina and noting: "[flor
the most part, the evacuation appeared to go smoothly.... There was no sign that the disaster of 2005,
when thousands were left stranded in misery for days and 1,600 people were killed-many of them
elderly-would be repeated.").
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administrators went to New Orleans during the March 2007 Spring Break to engage in volunteer service-what I call Katrina Service.
On that first volunteer school trip, we helped to clear the local jail of pre-trial
defendants unlawfully detained, many held since before Katrina on minor misdemeanor charges. We volunteered with The Pro Bono Project, a New Orleans nonprofit that provides legal assistance to Katrina survivors." Among other projects,
we assisted survivors who lost everything to the storm with their insurance and
Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") claims by retrieving deeds
to their destroyed houses. We also advocated on behalf of immigrant workers so
they would receive wages for work they had completed for unscrupulous contractors who refused to pay them. In addition to legal services, we also carried out
humanitarian assistance for Katrina survivors by volunteering with the St. Bernard Project. 12 We helped to rebuild a home in St. Bernard Parish, an area completely destroyed by the storm and floods.
The experience of collectively engaging in Katrina Service was transformative
for all involved. The Katrina & Beyond course and its practicum component, the
collective volunteer Alternative Spring Break in March 2007, began a unique and
enduring relationship between the University of the District of Columbia David
A. Clarke School of Law ("UDC-DCSL") and the people of New Orleans. Student organizations raised funds for the St. Bernard Project and took on family
law cases long-distance with The Pro Bono Project. After returning from New
Orleans, a group of law students who had worked with immigrant workers advocating for their wage claims produced a "Know Your Legal Rights" video, which
is now being used by attorneys and advocates in New Orleans.
In the Spring 2008 Semester, the law school offered the Katrina and Beyond
course again. Students and professors journeyed to New Orleans in March 2008
to engage in volunteer service, both legal and humanitarian. Joining thousands of
other law students who have traveled to New Orleans and the Mississippi Gulf
Coast to volunteer during spring, winter, and summer breaks since December

11 For twenty-two years, the Pro Bono Project has been the primary agency in New Orleans and
the surrounding parishes for connecting private attorneys with pro bono clients in need of free civil
legal services. Since Katrina, the Pro Bono Project has played a central role in coordinating and
providing legal assistance to storm survivors. The Pro Bono Project, http://www.probono-no.org (last
visited Mar. 22, 2009).
12 The St. Bernard Project is a non-profit home rebuilding organization formed in January 2006
by two former Washingtonians, Zack Rosenburg and Liz McCartney. As of Fall 2008, with the help of
over 9000 volunteers from across the nation, the St. Bernard Project had rebuilt 160 of the St. Bernard
Parish homes destroyed by Katrina. In November 2008, Liz McCartney received CNN's "Hero of the
Year" award. Dave Walker, St. Bernard Project Co-founder Honored; McCartney is CNN's "Hero of
the Year," TIMES-PICAY-UNE, Nov. 24, 2008, at Metro 1. For further information on this inspirational
project, visit http://www.stbernardproject.org.
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2005,13 UDC-DCSL students responded to the call for volunteer service once
again. The Katrina & Beyond course is being offered in the Spring 2009 Semester;
and in March 2009 students and professors again traveled to New Orleans to
assist residents with recovery legal issues and humanitarian rebuilding assistance.
The human loss and suffering, and the underlying effects of racism and poverty
that were exposed by the storms, has hit a collective nerve among law students
across the country in ways that no law school classroom could ever replicate. For
each of us who has participated in this collective experience, answering the call of
pro bono civic engagement in Katrina Service will have a lifelong impact on us as
attorneys and advocates. Volunteering in the face of the government's abandonment and neglect of many Katrina survivors has made this call to service all the
more urgent and compelling.
As a part of the ongoing commitment and relationship between the UDCDCSL and New Orleans, the Law Review has devoted this journal to the postKatrina reality and disaster relief. Some of these articles stem from the experiences of UDC-DCSL faculty and students who participated in the Katrina &
Beyond course and volunteered their services to the people of New Orleans.
Many of these pieces are also informed by the Law Review's 2008 Symposium,
Katrina's Wake: Emergency Preparednessand Response from the Bayou to the
Beltway.

Like this Essay, the Katrina's Wake Symposium was dedicated to the "men,
women and children who lost their lives during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
their survivors, and the tireless advocates who are working to build a better future."14 This dedication memorializes and honors those who lost their lives to
Katrina. Moreover, it also serves as a searing reminder that virtually every one of
the Katrina deaths could have, indeed should have, been avoided. The loss of life
and the level of destruction could have been minimized, if not avoided altogether,
if the levees had been adequately built and maintained by the federal Army
Corps of Engineers. As well, the deaths, trauma, and human suffering likely
would not have occurred if the poor, elderly, and disabled of New Orleans had
been safely evacuated by federal and local authorities, rather than abandoned in
nursing homes, on rooftops, and in the dire conditions of the Superdome.
13 See Student Hurricane Network, http://www.studentjustice.org/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2009)
(formed in 2005 by students of Tulane University Law School and Loyola University Law School).
"The Student Hurricane Network is a national network of law students dedicated to advancing the
cause of social justice in communities affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita by coordinating volunteer efforts, aiding public interest organizations, and educating members of the legal community
about legal crises in the region." Id. The network, founded in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, has
organized over 4500 law students from many of the nation's law schools to engage in pro bono legal
service in New Orleans and along the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Id.
14 UDC[DCSL LAW REVIEW, KATRINA'S WAKE: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
FROM THE BAYOU TO THE BELTWAY SYMPOSIUM PROGRAM (Feb. 29,2008) (on file with UDC/DCSL
Law Review).
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The Katrina'sWake Symposium was convened to explore the myriad of ways
in which the calamity surrounding the storms that devastated New Orleans and
the Gulf Coast provide crucial keys for: avoiding future calamities; demanding
government accountability and responsibility in disaster relief; and minimizing
15
the toll should a disaster occur, most notably within the nation's capital itself.
The Symposium was a dynamic part of the learning and volunteer service relationship that has grown between the city of New Orleans and UDC-DCSL. The
event brought people together to focus on what has happened to New Orleans
and the Gulf Coast during and after the 2005 Katrina and Rita hurricanes. As has
been the case each time that Americans have come together to discuss, learn
about, or volunteer for New Orleans, the Symposium participants took on one of
our nation's greatest challenges: America largely has forgotten about what happened in New Orleans and the Mississippi Gulf Coast; we must do whatever we can
to reverse that process.
Indeed, underlying the goals of the Symposium, the mission of the Katrina &
Beyond course, and the efforts of thousands of volunteers from across the country, has been a basic and enduring purpose. The need for an ongoing response to
Katrina is quite simply a matter of social justice and a challenge: a call to civic
service and engagement. It was precisely the necessity to focus attention on the
ongoing needs in the New Orleans area and to remind America of the tragic
events of the storm's aftermath that motivated the Law Review to convene this
Symposium on the legacy of Katrina.
As future leaders of the government and the legal system, young people generally, and law students in particular, will play an important role in applying the
lessons of the Katrina catastrophe. The impact of this disaster, which was unprecedented in its scope of destruction and massive displacement of residents, will be
felt for years to come. Katrina Lessons are the tools that will help prevent, or at
least minimize, these incalculable losses from occurring in the future should disaster strike in the Gulf Coast, elsewhere in our nation, or across the world.
These Katrina Lessons start with the reality that the disaster which nearly destroyed New Orleans and the Gulf Coast was not the first time such a catastrophe
occurred in this country, nor will it be the last time. We face the alarming
probability that unless government leaders, elected officials, community leaders,
and members of the law enforcement, judicial and academic communities learn
15 The Katrina's Wake Symposium explored: what the experience of Katrina means for other
urban areas that might confront disaster, particularly the District of Columbia; how disaster, natural
and man-made, can be avoided in the future; and how to build meaningful and effective emergency
preparedness. In addition, speakers focused on what we can learn post-Katrina about the administration of justice and providing for the needs of those most vulnerable should disaster strike. These
groups included children, the elderly and disabled, and those who are institutionalized in prisons,
hospitals, and mental institutions. Speakers also addressed the multi-dimensional aspects of social and
economic infrastructure which inevitably are affected by both natural and man-made disasters. See id.
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and apply the lessons of Katrina, much of the same could happen anywhere disaster hits. In fact, we remain vulnerable and largely unprepared, even as we try to
analyze and learn from the agonizingly slow recovery process in New Orleans,
now more than three years after Katrina first hit.
Underlying these lessons is the collective recognition that the government
largely has failed the people of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. Recognition of
the failures in pre-Katrina disaster preparation, emergency response, damage
mitigation, and relief efforts is necessary to achieving effective future recovery
efforts. Katrina Lessons are the key to creating the political and public will necessary to reinvigorate the recovery that is so desperately needed. And, Katrina Lessons are the basis for holding public officials accountable for what has occurred in
Katrina's wake, even now, more than three years later.
At times, lessons of such a massive and complex human tragedy can come
suddenly and from unanticipated sources. From August 30 through September 1,
2008, exactly three years after Katrina slammed into New Orleans and the Gulf
Coast, the nation watched nervously as Hurricane Gustav, a massive Category 3
hurricane, roared out of the Gulf of Mexico and raced toward the same Katrinadevastated areas. The historic pre-Gustav evacuation of New Orleans and other
major areas of the Gulf Coast was a testament to the fact that government agencies, national and local officials, as well as the media and the public, are highly
sensitive to the legacy of Katrina. The reaction to Gustav and the evacuation
showed that the authorities can learn and can do better in a crisis of this magnitude. However, the arrival of Gustav also revealed that the New Orleans levee
system had not been rebuilt since Katrina, but rather only patched and partially
upgraded. Experts, officials, and much of the local populace knew that if Gustav
came even close to the strength of Katrina or Rita, then the levees once again
would not hold.
Hurricane Gustav, followed two weeks later by Hurricane Ike, unexpectedly
refocused our attention on New Orleans and the Gulf Coast, casting harsh reminders of the devastation and human suffering caused by Katrina and the ongoing hardships faced by its victims.16 The intensive reaction to Gustav, which
ironically delayed the start of the Republican National Convention, brought to
light once again the stark failures of the Bush Administration in responding to
16 Hurricane Ike, a strong Category 2 storm, slammed into the Texas Gulf Coast on September
12, 2008, nearly devastating Galveston and causing massive destruction to Houston and surrounding
communities. Following two hurricane seasons of relative calm since Katrina, this hurricane season
saw a tremendous surge in dangerous Gulf Coast hurricane activity. As this Essay goes to press, the
author has done her best in updating the impact of these new hurricanes. The events surrounding
Hurricane Gustav and its impact on the Louisiana Gulf Coast will need to be fully evaluated; specifically for how effectively the governments applied the lessons of Katrina (e.g., whether coordination
and communication between state and federal agencies were improved, how the evacuation and reentry were conducted, and what was learned about the strength of the levee system). However, such an
evaluation is beyond the scope of this Essay.
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the tragedy of Katrina. Gustav signaled that Katrina Lessons are still being defined, internalized, and are yet to be fully applied in the face of impending
disasters.
Over the last three years, the residents of New Orleans have largely felt abandoned by local and federal governments. They have become increasingly frustrated by the apparent silence of the rest of the nation. Each day, they struggle
with the frustratingly slow and uneven recovery and rebuilding process. Those
who have returned to New Orleans have grown angrier at the lack of government
accountability, the difficulty and challenges of living in a still partially dysfunctional city, and the endless mire of bureaucratic bungling and red-tape blocking
the rebuilding process. While the physical devastation of Gustav, at least in New
Orleans, was not nearly as severe as Katrina's devastation, Gustav nevertheless
placed the spotlight once again on New Orleans-at least for a time. Gustav exposed that as a nation we remain vulnerable, that the levee system in New Orleans still has not been sufficiently rebuilt, and that much of the city still is in ruins,
as a result of Katrina and the floods.
In fact, Hurricane Gustav starkly exposed to the nation that much of New
Orleans and the Gulf Coast still had not recovered from Hurricane Katrina. As
Gustav was poised to slam into the Gulf Coast, news media flashed current
images of the ongoing state of destruction and ruin in New Orleans and along the
Mississippi Gulf Coast. It became painfully clear on Katrina's three-year anniversary that the scope of the catastrophe and its ongoing impact still were not fully
integrated into the national public consciousness. At the same time, the events of
Gustav appeared to generate a new surge of empathy for disaster victims, particularly for the people of New Orleans.
Now that we are in the post-Gustav and Ike era, the reality has set in that
Katrina, while an extraordinary and historic storm, would not be the last time
such a disaster would occur. The events of Gustav and Ike in the late summer of
2008 further drove home that we must embrace the lessons of what happens
when government utterly fails in disaster preparation, relief, and recovery. For
those of us who have engaged in Katrina Service, we have learned many lessons
from our experiences in New Orleans. We have talked with many Katrina survivors and worked side-by-side with them as they struggled to rebuild their lives
and homes. We have researched and explored why the disaster occurred and why
the recovery has been inexcusably slow and seriously flawed. This commitment
and service has led me to conclude that how our generation, and future generations, respond to Katrina will be a defining test for us as a nation.
Since I began volunteering in New Orleans, I have met and talked with dozens
and dozens of Katrina survivors, both those who have returned to this wounded
city and those still in the Katrina Diaspora.I have listened to and embraced their
stories. I have witnessed the physical and emotional devastation. Deeply affected
by these experiences, I came to more clearly understand how our government has

RETURNING TO NEW ORLEANS

miserably failed and abandoned the people of New Orleans and their ruined
communities.
This Essay is based in large part on my experiences over the last two years, and
my efforts to bear witness to the devastation of New Orleans. I address the myriad of issues raised by the destruction of New Orleans and the Mississippi Gulf
Coast by Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, in late August and early September 2005.
My focus is on New Orleans because of the particular devastation caused by the
massive flooding of the city when the levees failed. In Part I, I present several
stories of Katrina survivors who shared their experiences with me and which
comprise the starkest narrative of the storm's impact.
In Part II, I suggest concrete lessons from the Katrina experience that other
cities should embrace to learn both what not to do in the aftermath of a disaster
and what to do. I begin by outlining the demographics and condition of New
Orleans before Katrina hit. Particular attention is paid to the impact of racism
and poverty, so deeply-rooted and pervasive before the storm, which exacerbated
the storm's devastation and increased the city's vulnerability to this disaster. I
also analyze the effect that pre-existing urban problems can have on the scope of
a disaster's destruction, as applied to other urban areas in the nation. Finally, I
describe how the recovery of New Orleans depends on the safe and humanitarian
return of its displaced residents.
In Part III, I outline the consequences of the flawed recovery in New Orleans
and the ever-pressing need for a major, comprehensive federal government response. I propose an alternate approach to recovery than what has occurred to
date, specifically the development of federally led and funded policies and programs-in the nature of the New Deal administration. Using this "New Deal
Model" would best turn around the flawed recovery so that New Orleans and the
Gulf Coast region can be truly rebuilt, while also providing desperately needed
jobs for the area's former and current residents. I summarize the current state of
affairs in New Orleans and offer directions for change towards a social justice
approach to the recovery, healing and rebuilding. My focus throughout is on the
need to raise the post-Katrina situation on the national agenda and in the individual and collective consciousness of the American people.
This last point is crucial and underscores the central purpose of this Essay: to
raise the lessons and implications of Katrina in every forum possible. The recovery of New Orleans is a matter of primary and urgent national importance. New
national leadership is required to revive the collective political will needed to
reverse our government's three-year failure to adequately respond to the tragedy.
Each of us individually also has an important role to play in changing the situation; for the recovery is not over, in fact far from it.
As already noted, much of New Orleans' central neighborhoods and communities still lay in ruins as a result of Katrina. Over three years since the storm,
many Katrina survivors still are homeless and living with loss and trauma.
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Thousands of these survivors are displaced persons living within the borders of
the United States in what many call the KatrinaDiaspora.'7 A recent report indi-

cates that as a result of Katrina, approximately 65,500 former residences still sit
blighted and ruined, out of a total 213,780 residences in New Orleans.' 8 These
blighted, vacant buildings represent 34% of all pre-Katrina residences; they are

still unoccupied because they have not been rebuilt since Katrina. 19 Furthermore,
repopulation of New Orleans has been halting and incomplete. While a signifi-

cant number of residents returned in the eighteen months after Katrina, in the
last year population growth has dramatically slowed. The city is still missing onethird to one-half of its pre-Katrina population, and repopulation in the third year
of the recovery reflected not more than a 1% growth rate from the previous
20
year.
The ongoing failure of government agencies to effectively and comprehen-

sively address the catastrophic post-Katrina situation in New Orleans is one of
the most significant domestic policy failures in recent history. Along with the
national economic recession, it surely has been the signature domestic failure of
the Bush Administration. With the start of the Barack Obama Presidency, the
people of New Orleans are hopeful and expectant that change will now come,
and that the broken promises of recovery will begin to be fulfilled. The recent
high-profile and energized response of the media and government officials to

Hurricanes Gustav and Ike indicates that the images and consequences of Katrina are still very raw in the American consciousness. The fact that Hurricanes
17 Rick Jervis & Brad Heath, FEMA Spends Nearly $3B to House Hurricane Victims, USA
TODAY, Aug. 26, 2008, at 1A ("On the cusp of the storms' three-year anniversaries, more than 14,000
families remain in FEMA-funded apartments across the Gulf Coast and as far away as Alaska.").

18

GREATER

NEW

ORLEANS

COMMUNITY

DATA

CENTER,

NATIONAL

BENCHMARKS

FOR

BLIGHT (Mar. 31, 2008), http://gnocdc.s3.amazonaws.com!reportsfBlightBenchmarks.pdf [hereinafter
BENCHMARKS FOR BLIGHT] (reporting that, in addition to the 65,500 blighted former residences, another 6200 sit vacant); see also Heyoun Park, The Patchy Return of New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31,

2008, at A22.
19 BENCHMARKS FOR BLIGHT, supra note 18 (showing that the next highest percentage of vacant and/or blighted residences is in Detroit, Michigan at 18%).

20 The post-Katrina repopulation statistics vary widely; the current population of New Orleans
has been estimated to be from one-half to two-thirds of its pre-storm population. See, e.g., Adam
Nossiter, After Fanfare, HurricaneGrants Leave Little Mark, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2008, at A23 [hereinafter After Fanfare] ("[A]bout 72 percent of the city's population has returned, a clear improvement
from the 50 percent who were there immediately after the storm, but a stagnant growth from the last
anniversary before most of the money was disbursed, when 69 percent had returned. The Census
Bureau has given a lower estimate, saying that about 54 percent of the pre[-]storm population of
444,000 had returned as of June 2007."); Adam Nossiter, New Orleans Girdsfor Another Storm, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2008, at A18 ("From a half to a third of the pre[-]storm population of about 444,000 is
still absent."); New Orleans Ready to Evacuate, THE WEATHER CHANNEL, Aug. 28, 2008, http://
www.weather.com/newscenter/topstories/082808-gustav.html?from=search-siteresults%3C1%3E
("[E]stimates put the city's current population between 310,000 and 340,000 people. There were about
454,000 here before Katrina hit.").
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Gustav and Ike have brought renewed attention to the vulnerability of vast areas
of this nation to storm disasters further reinforces the observations and recommendations, as well as the urgent call for collective response raised in this Essay.
I.

STORIES OF SURVIVAL AND HOPE

When one ventures several blocks in any direction away from the traditional
tourist and high-income residential areas of the French Quarter, the Garden District and Uptown, it becomes immediately and shockingly apparent that the "recovery" of the neighborhoods where the majority of New Orleanians once lived is
failing. Most, but not all, of the higher-income, white residential areas, like the
Garden District, were originally built on higher ground. Therefore, while residences in those neighborhoods sustained wind and rain damage, they were not
devastated by the floods. These points and the following commentaries are based
upon my own eyewitness observations and dozens of conversations I had with
local residents, as I drove through and walked about this severely wounded city
and the surrounding parishes over the course of many months.
In the poorer African American communities, including Mid-City, Central
City, the Ninth Ward, the Lower Ninth Ward, once integrated neighborhoods,
such as Gentilly, and even the largely middle-income African American area of
New Orleans East, most of the rebuilding has been carried out by individual
home-owners or by private charities. These groups, including Habitat for Humanity, faith-based groups, and other non-profit agencies such as the St. Bernard Project, have been staffed by thousands of volunteers from colleges, high schools,
churches, synagogues, and law schools from around the country.
Turn a corner and the Katrina blight is visually jarring: rutted streets of
boarded-up houses; strip malls in ruins; apartment buildings bent in mid-collapse;
and wrecked schools inside cyclone fences hastily thrown up in the first round of
debris removal. It is clear that New Orleans is "back," but not for the majority of
the city's pre-Katrina population. For the first time, a majority of the city's households live in the least flooded areas of the city, such as Uptown, the Garden
District, and Algiers on the West Bank, up from 39% before the storm. 21 The
recovery process does not appear to have reached those people without resources: the renters, the poor, former residents of public housing complexes now
demolished by the government, those relegated to the FEMA trailers, or those
former residents who are still displaced outside of New Orleans, waiting to return
home. The government has yet to rebuild or restore many of the public schools
and libraries, public transportation, daycare centers, and assorted municipal
22
buildings.
21

THREE YEARS AFTER KATRINA, supra note 6, at 14.

22 Amy Liu & Nigel Holmes. The State of New Orleans:An Update, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2008,
at A19, and Park, supra note 18 (both articles report on the incomplete and patchy recovery three
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Over three years since Katrina, the visual line of demarcation between white
and African American communities is even starker than it was right after the
storm. Katrina indiscriminately and severely damaged or destroyed some white
and higher income areas of the city, most notably Lakeview and select parts of
Broadmoor. In these neighborhoods many homeowners had insurance, means
and personal resources to rebuild, and the residents are coming back in large
numbers. However, in the extensive neighborhoods where largely poor and African American people once lived, most notably the Lower Ninth Ward and parts
of Central City, most residents have been unable to return.
In these areas, thousands of houses still lay in ruins although the immense piles
of debris have been for the most part removed. In the Lower Ninth Ward, where
over twelve feet of raging floodwaters killed a thousand people within minutes of
the levee breaking, vast sections of the community are empty rutted lots. An
occasional concrete set of crumbled front stairs leads to nowhere. Original spraypainted markings placed by first-responder rescue teams to indicate the number
of dead bodies and pets and the height of the floodwaters remain visible on the
ruined front doorways of the wreckage. Spray-paintings added by frustrated residents scream out, "THIS WAS ONCE OUR HOME, AMERICAP"--"THIS
IS OUR BAGHDAD!"--"PEOPLE, DON'T FORGET US: WE ARE AMERICANS TOO!"
This is not a small or limited area. In these devastated communities one can
drive up and down the former streets, now rutted and broken, for an hour or
more and see nothing but deserted areas, blight, and rubble. One might see an
occasional rebuilt house sitting alone or a FEMA trailer set in the middle of the
vast emptiness. Snapshot visuals encapsulate the enormity of the destruction as
one travels through these deserted streets. The impact is seen in the wreckage of
what was once a large public elementary school: student lockers tossed out of the
ruins from a second floor lay toppled, rusted, and broken in haphazard stacks on
the gutted street below. Young children once went to school, ate their lunches,
and played there at recess. Years after the storm, the rubble of these children's
lives and education still lay in ruins, exposed as open wounds.
The feelings of emptiness, abandonment, death, and incalculable loss pervade
the atmosphere as tragic reminders of what occurred there. Seeing these ruins,
festering each day in the infamous New Orleans swelter of heat and humidity,
mixing with the toxicity of the sludge and wreckage left by the floodwaters, one
becomes painfully aware that the situation since the storm has worsened rather
than improved. These ruins are more than eyesores and images of urban blight:
they are stinging reminders of what once was and of an assault on the past reyears after Katrina as measured in terms of occupied households, unemployment rates, size of labor
force, open child care centers, operating public transportation, new home constructions, unoccupied
addresses, air passenger traffic, and open public schools.)
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sidents' dignity and humanity. As each day goes by the possibility of recovery
feels more elusive, as if these ruins will stay in place forever. The searing presence of these ruins fuels the constantly growing and burning desire for accountability from the Bush Administration generally, FEMA specifically, the private
insurance companies, as well as local and state officials.
Katrina survivors who have returned to their city deal with this reality daily.
Many try to avoid seeing these ruins, if they can, as they try to rebuild their lives,
retrieve a semblance of normalcy, and hold on to hope. Survivors eagerly share
their stories with people who are willing to listen. They warmly express thanks to
volunteers who have come to help. As one travels the city, it is virtually impossible not to meet survivors and hear their stories. Those who lived in New Orleans
before the storm clearly have been transformed by the events of Katrina and
their lives have been changed forever. It appears that the desire to tell one's story
and the process of storytelling are a vital part of the healing process.
Among the many who told me their stories, there are palpable and complex
senses and emotions. Bittersweet sadness, a strong pervasive sense of abandonment, a uniquely New Orleans resiliency, and intense pride and love for their city
are spiced with a deep simmering anger aimed at the difficult and piecemeal recovery. For many people who have returned to New Orleans, it is too emotionally
taxing to take it all in and think about the disaster on a daily or constant basis.
This is, in part, a defense mechanism necessary because of the many unanswered
questions about what happened and why, and because of the enormous difficulties of daily life. A visitor does not have to look far at all to hear these stories, but
rather just open oneself up to empathize. Indeed, everyone has a Katrina story.
No one account is more or less dramatic than the other; no one report more or
less traumatic than the next. Each narrative is distinctive and unique, and each is
a symbol of Katrina's impact and legacy.
A.

Jackie - A New Generation of FEMA Trailer Survivors

Jackie is about twenty-five years old, of mixed race ethnic heritage, and a
mother of four young children all under the age of seven. Since Katrina, she and
her children had been living with her boyfriend in a large FEMA trailer camp just
outside of New Orleans. FEMA, like other federal agencies, strictly enforces its
elaborate set of regulations, including zero tolerance for any drug or alcohol use
within its trailer camps.
Jackie and her children lived in a several-hundred-square-foot trailer that was
registered under her boyfriend's name. Under FEMA regulations, only one person in an identified family can register for FEMA benefits, including a trailer.
When Jackie's boyfriend was caught smoking marijuana, FEMA repossessed the
trailer and permanently threw out her family. Since then, Jackie has moved from
23 The names of the storytellers have been changed to preserve these survivors' privacy.
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trailer to trailer within the camp, going from one relative to another with four
young children in tow.
Every two weeks, as FEMA officials checked each trailer's occupants, Jackie
and her children had to leave and go on to another trailer. All of Jackie's extended family members were residents of the trailer camp. Their collective and
intertwined lives were trapped within the confines of this FEMA site, which
looked like a refugee camp. Like Jackie and her children, thousands of other
Katrina survivors languished in these FEMA trailer camps. Most adults, including
Jackie, did not have jobs and many children did not attend school.
While FEMA was originally authorized to case-manage these trailer occupants, according to Jackie, FEMA offered few services or benefits to her family.
In mid-February 2008, the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") issued a report
confirming the suspicions of many trailer occupants and their advocates that
these FEMA trailers were toxic, exuding unusually high levels of formaldehyde.2 4
This CDC report indicated that the toxicity of the FEMA trailers could lead to
increased risk of long-term, chronic, and other illnesses, including cancer and respiratory illness.25
The distribution and regulation of the thousands of trailers issued post-Katrina
and management of these trailer sites had been the main tasks of FEMA. Not
only did the agency fail to efficiently and humanely carry this assignment out, it
also literally poisoned the intended beneficiaries. Talking to Jackie and sensing
her disempowerment and loss, one has to ask whether FEMA's actions were an
unfortunate and negligent act of inept government mismanagement or something
more sinister.26 What has become of Jackie and her four children, and the
thousands like her has largely not been reported and is most likely unknown to
officials. Like many others who have left the FEMA trailer camps, Jackie's family
probably is living with relatives, is now homeless, or has left the area
permanently.
B.

James - Returning to New Orleans Once Is Enough

James, in his mid-sixties, had worked for the New Orleans Regional Transportation Agency as a conductor on the historic St. Charles trolley line for thirty-five
years. He was born and raised in New Orleans. When Katrina hit, he and his wife
24 Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, CDC Releases Results of Formaldehyde
Level Tests (Feb. 14, 2008), http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=42606.
25 See id. (reporting that the CDC and FEMA released findings from recent testing "that found
higher than typical indoor exposure levels of formaldehyde in travel trainers and mobile homes used
as emergency housing in the Gulf Coast Region").
26 Michael Kunzelman, FEMA Finishing Closure of Louisiana Trailer Parks, USA TODAY, May
31, 2008, at 5A. On May 31, 2008, FEMA was scheduled to reclaim all of its trailers and evict all
occupants throughout the state of Louisiana; however, no plan was in place to offer or provide alternative housing for the remaining trailer residents, about 5000 families. Id.
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evacuated to Houston for almost a year. Upon returning to New Orleans, James
rebuilt his house, which had been in his African American family for three generations. His job driving the St. Charles Street trolley was gone, as the trolley was
out of commission due to the flooding until January 2008. Although he is old
enough to retire, James now works for a rental car company. He picks up customers and runs vans over to the newly reopened cruise line terminal for day-visitors
disembarking from the cruise ships. James described to me what the city looked
like when he returned last year from Houston and what challenges he and his
family faced in post-Katrina New Orleans. "It was like bombs had gone off, like
what I saw when I was in the military service," he explained.
I learned from James about the changes that have occurred, for better and
worse, since Katrina. He seemed to know everything about the city and its history. James explained to me why the plot of sod that surrounds the trolley line
tracks is called neutralground ("when the Spanish and French were warring here,
they put down their arms on these spots"). He described to me why the city now
smells so incredibly rancid when it rains ("death rising up from the ground"), and
why some neighborhoods look okay, while other areas are still littered with storm
wreckage. He shared with me the same explanation for the lopsided recovery that
I repeatedly heard from other local people: "Crooks, the government people are
all crooks, that's why. They took the money and stuffed it into their own pockets
and now we're left to fend for ourselves. That's why. Crooks, just crooks, and
nobody's doing a thing about it."
James explained that many things seem to have improved and to be "almost
back to normal" in some neighborhoods, especially the tourist and upscale areas.
Yet, the city is not the same place it once was and probably never will be. He
patiently shared his analysis that New Orleans is now two cities-one on the rise
and one in permanent decline and demise. According to James, this is the new
reality of his beloved hometown. "No matter the cause," James explained, "this is
what we are becoming." One can think it is the result of a racist conspiracy by
government officials to recreate New Orleans as a white middle class city, or
simply the result of decades of benign neglect and failure to maintain the city's
infrastructure and public buildings. Or perhaps, he offered, it is the "crooks,"
bureaucratic red tape and ineptitude, or some combination of these factors. To
James, in the end it really does not matter. As described so poignantly by James,
the recovery process is mired in bureaucratic red tape, unaccounted-for funds,
fraud, and lack of leadership at every level of government.
With deep sadness and a tone of resignation in his voice, James said, "It's just
not the same people here anymore. New young ones came in to run the restaurants, the hotels, the schools, even the rental car offices. The heart of the oldtimers is gone, and folks just don't have the wherewithal to do it all over again."
Reflecting on his past and future, he added: "We did okay in Houston that year
after the storm, but we had to come home. Coming home was always ahead of us
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in our minds. My wife and I say if this happens again, if a big storm like Katrina
comes again and we evacuate to Houston, we wouldn't come home to New Orleans again next time. You can try returning home like this only once in a lifetime.
We just wouldn't come back home again."
C.

Sheila and Charles - Waiting for Barack Obama

Sheila and Charles live with their six grandchildren in a classic New Orleans
"shotgun" frame house in the Holy Cross area of the Lower Ninth Ward, between St. Claude Avenue and the Mississippi River. Their story aptly describes
the state of people's lives more than three years after Katrina and the floods.
With his own hands, Charles, who is probably in his early sixties, has been rebuilding their once-flooded and uninhabitable home. On the Saturday afternoon
that I met the family, their home's clapboard siding was new and freshly painted,
their driveway was newly paved with asphalt, and new elaborate fencing bordered their lot. Charles lived on this corner of this now largely devastated neighborhood all of his life. He and Sheila, who grew up a few blocks away, had known
the grocer who occupied the corner store across the street forty years ago. Today,
that storefront is home to an art installation, intended to draw outsiders to this
neighborhood so they can witness the devastation of the Lower Ninth Ward.
Sheila and Charles are the neighborhood's self-appointed ambassadors, waving over the art installation's visitors to chat and describe the ongoing impact of
Katrina. The couple listed the names of all the neighbors who fled the floods in
August 2005 and have yet to return. Sheila and Charles also had to evacuate and
lived in Virginia with their eldest son for a year before they ventured to return to
New Orleans. Now they are surrounded by ruins and a few newly rebuilt houses.
Sheila told me, at this point, all she wished for was a working kitchen in time to
make her Thanksgiving dinner. "It looks pretty good now from the outside, but if
I invited you in, it wouldn't look so good to you," she said apologetically. One by
one, Charles and Sheila's grandchildren, from the four-year-old to the sixteenyear-old, came up to shake hands and introduce themselves.
The entire time we talked, one granddaughter, who looked about six years old,
meticulously painted the new wrought iron fence surrounding the lot with a tiny
paintbrush. "She's our work horse," Charles said, pointing to the child, "she
won't stop until the whole place is finished. Used to be early on there were volunteers who came by from out of town to help us... from some church group in the
Midwest, then a high school group from New Jersey. Those kids were great. But
no more. It's up to us now; we're on our own. The politicians talked a lot, but the
government gave us no real help. Everything you see here, it's because we came
back. And, we'll just keep at it until it's home again. Have to do it, put a roof over
these grandkids' heads. Even Brad Pitt and Angelina [Jolie], building those big
houses a few blocks away, those are big houses and are beauties that they're
putting up. But this one is where I was born and it's where I'll stay."
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As Sheila and Charles described the circumstances of their long-time neighbors, most of whom were still gone, it became clear that the Holy Cross neighborhood of the Lower Ninth Ward had once been a cohesive and culturally vibrant
community. Neighbors knew one another for years and chose to live there, stay
there and raise their families, at least until Katrina. Yet, on the day of our visit
there did not seem to be many other residents living on the block, or on the
adjacent blocks. Nonetheless, Charles and Sheila brimmed with pride because
they had returned to rebuild and reclaim their neighborhood from the ruins. They
were optimistic and welcoming, while also determined and intent on moving
forward.
Inevitably, our conversation turned to Barack Obama, who had won the presidential election only a few days earlier. Sheila, Charles, and their grandchildren
were thrilled about the historic election. Upon hearing that I came from Washington, D.C. to volunteer in New Orleans, they excitedly asked about the nation's
capital and what it is like to live there. While peppering me with questions about
the upcoming Inauguration, they said they expected Barack Obama to visit their
neighborhood soon after he was sworn in as president. I asked if they thought
Barack Obama as president would make a difference to New Orleans. "Yes, of
course," one grandson quickly replied, "because he has got to do a better job
than President Bush." Sheila added, "Barack made history for all of us, and by
getting elected, he won for all of us, especially for us here in New Orleans."
Charles showed me the woodworking shop in his newly rebuilt garage. It was
filled with paintings and posters depicting Barack Obama, Malcolm X, and Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. "My eldest grandson paints these, and when Barack does
come to the Lower Ninth, we'll show him these if he comes by our place." As I
left them, I realized that Charles and Sheila will prevail in finishing their homeSheila may even have her new kitchen finished in time for Thanksgiving. I also
left with the hope that President Obama would soon visit the Lower Ninth Ward,
and perhaps meet Sheila, Charles, and their grandchildren. And, it occurred to
me that many people of this good city seem to be waiting for Barack Obama.
D. Ali - America Has Changed Channels on His Moment of Fame
Ali is a taxi driver who came to live in New Orleans from the Middle East
twenty-eight years ago. I was in his cab only moments before he started telling
me his Katrina story. Before the storm, Ali, his wife Nina, and their two daughters, ages sixteen and ten, lived in Mid-City with their Labrador retriever,
Mickey. As Katrina approached, Ali drove his family to stay with relatives in
Mississippi, leaving the dog behind. He returned to New Orleans that night,
thinking he could keep watch over their home and retrieve Mickey.
During the night, Katrina hit New Orleans and tore the roof off of Ali's house.
The next day, the floodwaters began to rise. When the water rose six feet inside
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of his house, Ali waded outside holding tightly onto Mickey. He joined a group of
about fifty neighbors, all of whom had waded through the oily and filthy floodwaters, escaping their houses. The group included crying babies and elderly men and
women. They all waded together to a neighborhood bank building and went inside, thinking they would be safe within the sturdy brick structure. Within an
hour, the bank building flooded, and the group had no recourse but to climb onto
its roof. At some point, Mickey disappeared in the chaos. Bereft about losing
Mickey, Ali nonetheless turned his attention to his group of neighbors who were
visibly suffering, extremely frightened, exhausted, soaked, hungry, and thirsty.
From about 4:30 that afternoon until 11:00 that evening, Ali and another man
stood on the bank's roof waving anything they could get their hands on. Finally, a
U.S. Coast Guard crew flying overhead in a large helicopter spotted the group.
The Coast Guard started lifting Ali and his neighbors up from the roof by carrying several persons at a time in the helicopter's net basket. Unbeknownst to Ali
at the time, a CNN news crew was filming and broadcasting the Coast Guard
rescue from a nearby highway overpass.
The Coast Guard first responders initially took Ali and his neighbors to the
University of New Orleans. They stayed there until the university buildings became uninhabitable later that day. Then, other rescue teams, that Ali could not
identify, transported him and the group by bus and left them on a highway overpass near the Superdome. Eventually, after waiting in long lines in rainy, sweltering heat for many hours, Ali boarded a bus that took him and other people to the
Houston Astrodome. Ali languished there for two weeks not knowing what had
happened to his wife, daughters, or dog. The relief agencies at the Astrodome fed
people, but did not give them bus tickets, communicate information, or attempt
to connect them with their loved ones. Ali was not able to call his wife in Mississippi, where he feared the storm had also hit.
Ali said that while at the Houston Astrodome, he met Oprah Winfrey, who
had flown into Houston to comfort and assist the Katrina evacuees. According to
Ali, the next day he was asked to appear on Dr. Phil, who, like Oprah, was airing
his television show live from the Astrodome. Ali told me, "I got a hug out of
Oprah for all of this, and she wasn't like on TV. She was wearing blue jeans and
hugging everyone she could and crying with them at the Astrodome." He continued, "Oprah told us, 'Don't feel sorry for yourselves, you're not victims ... you

are now Katrina SURVIVORS!' I'll never forget that, it gave me hope."
Finally, one day Ali was called over by the aid workers and told that his family
had called for him. His sister-in-law had seen him weeks earlier on CNN being
lifted off of the New Orleans' bank roof by the Coast Guard. Then they saw him
on the Dr. Phil show, so they knew he was alive and at the Astrodome. His wife
and children had safely evacuated from Mississippi to South Carolina and were
with his brother and sister-in-law. Knowing from the television shows that Ali
was alive; his family tracked him down at the Astrodome.
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"I made my way to South Carolina and we were all reunited. We did okay in
South Carolina, I worked for a grocer and got a good job. But we worried for our
dog, Mickey, and wanted to return home to New Orleans," explained Ali. "Six
months later, it was a miracle, our dog was returned back to us. She had been
found wondering along Canal Street after the floodwaters receded. An animal
rescue group had taken Mickey to Austin, Texas where she lived with a family
until we tracked her down. It's all a miracle."
Before I exited his taxi, Ali pulled out a laminated copy of a newspaper article
and showed me the story with a picture of him, his family, and dog reunited in
South Carolina. "Since we came back to New Orleans eight months ago, we're
just getting by. Now I drive a taxi again, but the only place we could find to live is
on the West Bank, half the size of our former home, which could not be saved,
and for three times the rent." With a mixture of sadness, wistfulness, and anger,
Ali concluded, "But New Orleans was our home and we only thought about returning.., now we are not so sure. My wife and I worked hard for the things we
saw disappear in the floods. I praise God every day that I survived to tell this
story."
Ali's Katrina story is particularly distinctive because he found an element of
fame for a time. He had found a moment of hope, courage and stardom with the
help of CNN, Oprah Winfrey and Dr. Phil. Yet, today he is a struggling taxi
driver worried about the extreme trauma his family has experienced, where the
rent is going to come from, and how they are going to survive in post-Katrina
New Orleans. Today Ali finds his audience not on television, but in his taxicab,
where he talks with whoever will listen. Sadly, America has by now switched
channels.
II.

LESSONS OF THE STORM: WHAT CAUSED THE GREAT
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America indeed has, in large measure, switched channels. Until Hurricanes
Gustav and Ike raced out of the Gulf Coast as eerie reminders of the near destruction of New Orleans in August 2005, Americans had, for the most part,
turned their attention away from Katrina's destruction and its survivors. Yet, the
stories told by the survivors and the victims of this unprecedented disaster collectively comprise the legacy of what happened. These stories serve as a testament
to the nearly 1.2 million people who immediately, and in many cases permanently, were displaced by the storm.27 Joining these survival narratives in contex27 GABE ET AL., supra note 9, at 14. Approximately 1.2 million persons were displaced from
New Orleans, the surrounding six parishes and the Gulf Coast, many permanently; however, reported
numbers of evacuees vary. See, e.g., id. ("[Tihe analysis in this report assumes 700,000 were acutely
impacted... and media reports have cited figures as high as 1.2 million in describing the displaced.");
BRUCE KATZ ET AL., THE BROOKINGS INST., HOUSING FAMILIES DISPLACED BY KATRINA: A REVIEW
OF THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO DATE 1 (Nov. 11, 2005) ("Within a week, Hurricane Katrina dis-
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tualizing the Katrina tragedy are both poverty and race demographics and
reports of the long-standing urban ills and blight that characterized New Orleans
for decades. These factors and other lessons of the storm are outlined in the following sections.
While not first-hand narratives of Katrina survival, these factors tell a similarly
compelling story. By describing who lived in New Orleans before the storm and
the concentrated levels of poverty, racial segregation and bias, these descriptors
provide a context for understanding the poor state of the schools, employment,
child welfare, and housing leading up to August 2005. They also help to explain
the profound impact that Katrina and the floods had on impoverished communities, and why recovery has been so troubled and ineffective in these areas.
More than three years after the storm, it is surely no secret what went wrong in
New Orleans when Katrina slammed into the city and the levees broke. In remembering the shocking images of poor, largely African American, New Orleanians crying out for help from rooftops and pushing through deadly floodwaters,
the reasons for the depth and scope of the devastation begin to surface. The lessons, the keys to understanding what can be done to prevent or at least minimize
the impact of future disasters across the nation, are also not elusive, mystical, or
beyond analytical grasp. In order to cull the crucial lessons from this tragedy, a
hard and piercing look at what went wrong in New Orleans and what led up to
and contributed to the scope of the destruction, is required.
Katrina exposed serious underlying and pre-existing weaknesses of New Orleans. These serious problems ranged from flawed ineffective levees and loss of
protective coastal wetlands, to decades of racist segregation, discrimination, and
economic neglect that left hundreds of thousands stranded or abandoned when
the disaster hit. Today, Katrina's ongoing impact continues to expose these serious flaws, which had been left to fester and grow for so long and which now
exacerbate the recovery. Understanding the conditions of life in New Orleans
before Katrina-what daily life was like for those like Jackie, James, Sheila,
Charles, and Ali, as well as their families-is the starting point for this analysis.

placed more than a million Gulf Coast residents."). An early governmental report indicated that less
than 1 million persons had been displaced. LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 1, at 8-9 ("Around 770,000
people were displaced-the largest since the Dust Bowl migration from the southern Great Plains
region in the 1930s." (citing Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Dept. of Homeland Security, testimony
before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (Feb. 15, 2006)). This
same official report also states that over 1.1 million people had evacuated the Gulf Coast area in the
face of Hurricane Katrina. Id. at 9 ("Of the 1.1 million people over the age of sixteen who evacuated
in August 2005, approximately 500,000 of those evacuees had not returned home by late December.").
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A.

Apartheid Recovery: The Impact of Racial Discriminationand
Poverty Before and After Hurricane Katrina

Certainly one of the most important lessons of Katrina is that this situation did
not happen overnight with one massive, uniquely powerful, and destructive
storm. The shocking television images of the many stranded, desperate, starving,
and drowning New Orleanians-largely poor and African American-were so
jarring, in part, because most Americans were not aware that so many in this city
lived in such pervasive and abject poverty. The media images from the
Superdome, rooftops of flooded homes, and highway overpasses filled with desperate evacuees exposed a social system marred by racial segregation and discrimination. Many Americans were surprised and disheartened that the
government, in a time of crisis, would abandon its own citizens and deem them so
disposable that it allowed people to be literally swept away by floodwaters, or left
to starve or die on rooftops. The reality is that Hurricane Katrina starkly and
disproportionately hit communities where African Americans and the poor of
New Orleans resided.28
Indeed, a central lesson of Katrina is that we cannot allow our inner cities to
become such highly concentrated poverty areas, segregated by race, and then be
surprised when they are so vulnerable to disasters both natural and man-made. In
other words, those hardest hit by Katrina and those left unprotected or stranded
during the storm, in most respects, had been abandoned by the government long
before Katrina ravaged New Orleans. Most notably, the African American residents of sections of the city like the Ninth Ward and Lower Ninth Ward, Central
City, Mid-City, Gert Town, and parts of New Orleans East for decades lacked
resources and services on almost all levels, such as: quality housing and schools,
decent grocery stores, libraries, safe streets, day care centers, cars, and public
transportation. The effects of systemic poverty in all of its manifestations followed Katrina survivors both into and after the storm. While the storm and
floods knew no economic, social or racial boundaries as they surged through the
different sections of the city, poverty followed Katrina survivors, including many
of those in the Katrina Diaspora.The majority of poor African Americans displaced from the areas most stricken by Katrina have not been able to return to
rebuild their lives in New Orleans.
The dual impact of poverty and race, so forceful for decades in pre-Katrina
New Orleans, continues to define the outcomes of recovery and return. In fact,
what we are seeing is an apartheid recovery process. This is the result of either
intentional design or the failure of government to ensure that rebuilding occurs
28 GABE ET AL., supra note 9, at 16 ("The hurricane's impact on New Orleans also took a
disproportionate toll on African Americans. An estimated 310,000 black people were directly impacted by the storm largely due to flooding in Orleans Parish. Blacks are estimated to have accounted
for 44% of storm victims.").
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evenly, equitably, and fairly across all affected communities. Even working- and
middle-class African American communities, like New Orleans East, lag far behind the rebuilding undertaken in predominately white communities with a similar economic base.
Despite the anomalies, most notably the catastrophic storm destruction in the
white, middle-class sections of Lakeview and in historically white blue-collar St.
Bernard Parish, it would be misleading not to recognize the impact that race and
poverty had on the level of destruction wrought by the storm. Related racial and
economic disparities among the abilities of communities to recover and to rebuild
have been observed post-Katrina. In short, the majority of the pre-Katrina population of New Orleans, largely poor and African American, had been left vulnerable by decades of poverty and racial segregation. These at-risk communities
lacked essential infrastructure and resources, including a means of evacuation as
the storm approached the city.
In addition, the hardest hit communities had been built below sea level, making them easy targets for the flooding exacerbated by a flawed levee system. In
short, these areas lay vulnerable to the impact of natural and man-made disasters.
This legacy of racism, racial segregation, and discrimination ran through the heart
of the city's urban development. As a result, the great majority of houses and
apartment buildings in African American neighborhoods of New Orleans were
severely damaged or destroyed by Hurricane Katrina and the ensuing floods.
Over 80% of the city's pre-Katrina population of approximately 440,000 residents was completely uprooted. 29 As noted previously, more than three years
after the storm not more than two-thirds of the city's pre-Katrina population has
returned. 30 Furthermore, the repopulation of the city has slowed significantly
since the first two years after the storm. From August 2007 to June 2008, the city
experienced only a 1% population increase over the prior two years. 3 ' Unless the
local and federal governments initiate major incentive and support programs for
long-term evacuees in the Katrina Diaspora,the city's population may stop at or
near the current levels.
Observers of the city's progress can see that most meaningful recovery work
undertaken by the federal and local governments has been directed to rebuilding
tourist areas, downtown businesses, and wealthy, primarily white areas. At the
same time, most recovery work that has occurred in the poor African American
areas of New Orleans has been carried out by private charitable foundations and
29

THE URBAN

INST.,

AFTER KATRINA:

REBUILDING OPPORTUNITY

AND EQUITY INTO THE

(Margery Austin Turner & Sheila R. Zedlewski eds., 2006) [hereinafter REBUILDING
AND EouIrY]; see also THREE YEARS AFTER KATRINA, supra note 6, at tbl.1.

NEW ORLEANS 1
OPPORTUNITY

30

See discussion supra note 20.

THREE YEARS AFrER KATRINA, supra note 6, at 8 ("[O]nly a small growth from August
2007, when population reached 69 percent of the pre-Katrina total . .. a one-percent increase over
one year.").
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by volunteers. As noted earlier, thousands of these volunteers have come from
churches, synagogues, youth groups, colleges, and law schools across the country
to work with non-profit agencies, such as Habitat for Humanity, to help rebuild
homes. The entire city suffers from the lack of a comprehensive rebuilding strategy that would ensure an equitable, planned recovery of residential communities
across economic and racial lines, protecting all from future storms and flooding.
As a result, the individual rebuilding of homes in the most devastated areas is
entirely haphazard and undertaken by individuals able to prevail with their insurance, FEMA and Road Home claims. Therefore, a newly constructed or rebuilt
home may stand in the midst of a vast empty expanse, usually in close proximity
to a Katrina levee breach.
In pre-Katrina New Orleans, the social fabric for residents revolved around a
universally recognized, culturally unique and diverse environment. The city's
economy, largely based on tourism and trade conventions, thrived on thousands
of visitors drawn to New Orleans' rich heritage of music, architecture, languages,
food, festivals, and celebrations, such as Mardi Gras. Yet, the demographic factors speak clearly to the fact that New Orleans was one of the poorest and most
racially segregated cities in the United States. 32 For decades, New Orleans suffered from urban blight, an extremely high rate of concentrated poverty, racial
segregation, high unemployment, and a defunct and failed school system.3 3
Before Katrina, the city's residents were predominately African American
(68%), many of whom lived in poverty, while whites comprised approximately
28% of the total population.3 4 This balance is now shifting dramatically, the result of an uneven recovery and repopulation process.
In pre-Katrina New Orleans poverty was pervasive for the majority of the population, which was solidly African American. The child poverty rate in New Orle-

32

WILLIAM FREY & DOWELL MYERS, RACIAL SEGREGATION IN U.S. METROPOLITAN AREAS

AND CITIES,

1990-2000:

PATTERNS, TRENDS, AND EXPLANATIONS 3 (2005).

33

REBUILDING OPPORTUNITY AND EQUITY, supra note 29, at 1.
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THE URBAN INST., KATRINA: DEMOGRAPHICS OF A DISASTER (Sept. 9, 2005), http://www.

urban.org/UploadedPDF/900835_katrina-factsheet.pdf (noting that, based on data from the 2000 U.S.
Census, 11.5% of whites in New Orleans pre-Katrina lived in poverty, compared to 35% of the city's
African Americans); see also THE CENTER FOR SOCIAL INCLUSION: A PROJECT OF THE TIDES
CENTER, THE RACE TO REBUILD: THE COLOR OF OPPORTUNITY AND THE FUTURE OF NEW ORLEANS

4 (Aug. 2006). Prior to Katrina, the city was shrinking in population and opportunity, but had not
always been predominately African American or as severely segregated. After 1970, segregation and
concentrated poverty among African Americans in New Orleans skyrocketed, in large part because
half of the city's white population moved to the suburbs between 1970 and 2000. ALAN BERUBE &
BRUCE KATZ, THE BROOKINGS INST., KATRINA'S WINDOW: CONFRONTING CONCENTRATED
ERTY ACROSS AMERICA

poverty.htm.
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3-5, available at http://www.brook.edu/metro/pubs/20051012_concentrated
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ans was among the highest in the nation. 35 Children living in the communities
damaged and flooded by the hurricane were more likely living in single-mother
headed households than children nationwide.3 6 The general poverty rate in New
Orleans, which exceeded 40%, ranked it second poorest among cities of its size
across the country. 37 All of these factors-the high percentage of single-parent
families, high unemployment, and very low family incomes-added up to the
city's overall very high poverty rates. Viewed in this context, the need for government agencies, recovery officials, and political and civic leaders to do everything
possible in order for families to return safely to the city, to quality housing, goodpaying jobs, health care, and schools, is a major priority. Ignoring or refusing to
carry out this obligation will result in even starker segregation and a majority
white population replacing the once-majority African American population.
The beginning of this devolution is already evident in the uneven, indeed, the
apartheid approach to recovery. Those with means-predominately those in the
white neighborhoods and tourist areas-are rebuilding and recovering, while the
former African American communities are still, for the most part, in ruins and
sparsely repopulated. The possible result of these factors is worth repeating and,
quite simply, cannot be overstated. What is needed is an equitable, citywide and
comprehensive rebuilding plan, the completion of a thorough levee restructuring
project, and strong, federally-backed incentive programs for repopulation. Otherwise, what has been an apartheid recovery process to date will result in a permanently re-segregated metropolis-this time with an overwhelmingly majority
white and middle-class population.
B.

In the Face of Disaster, the Population Must Be Humanely and Safely
Evacuated and Protected Against Displacement and Dislocation

Another key lesson of New Orleans' Katrina experience for other urban centers is that when a disaster evacuation occurs, plans must be in place ahead of
time to ensure that displacement is neither long-lasting nor permanent. New Orleans did not have emergency plans for evacuation of its poorest residents, for
their temporary shelter, nor for return and relocation of those who eventually
were evacuated. In short, the mass displacement and the failed and inhumane de35 ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, 2005 KIDs COUNT DATA BOOK: MOVING YOUTH FROM RISK
OPPORTUNITY 1 (2005). The child poverty rate reflects the percentage of children living below the
poverty level. Id.
36 GABE ET AL., supra note 9, at 19. 37.7% of children in Hurricane Katrina damaged or
flooded areas lived in female-headed families, as compared to 20% nationwide. Id. This high rate of
children living with "single mothers also is consistent with the hurricane having disproportionately
affected African Americans, as African American children are more likely than children of other
racial and ethnic groups to be raised by a single mother." Id.
37 BERUBE & KATZ, supra note 34, at 3.
TO
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settlement of the populace in Katrina's aftermath must be avoided in future
disasters.
What ensued in Katrina's wake was displacement to out-of-state locations for
thousands of evacuees, creating what has been called the Katrina Diaspora, as
discussed earlier in this Essay. For thousands of others who later made their way
back to New Orleans and Louisiana, post-Katrina life meant living in the nowinfamous toxic FEMA trailers.3 8 FEMA set an end date of May 31, 2008 for
reclaiming all trailers from Katrina survivors, regardless of whether they had alternative housing available by the deadline. 39 Unsuitable for habitability as the
FEMA trailers were, the agency's reclaiming of the trailers without another housing plan in place for Katrina survivors will dramatically increase the homelessness
of former residents.
By May of 2008, homeless persons and families were living in a tent city under
an 1-10 overpass several blocks west of the city's downtown commercial area, and
others were squatting in the ruins of houses destroyed by Katrina and the
floods. 4 0 Homelessness was a major problem in New Orleans before the storm,
and is an ever-growing and critically important issue for the recovering city. By
all estimates, the ranks of homeless persons have swelled from roughly 6000
before the storm to over 12,000 after Katrina. By the spring of 2008, that figure
represented one in twenty-five persons living in New Orleans, or 4% of the city's
post-Katrina population. 4'
Adequate and safe housing is now a top challenge and a growing problem for
New Orleans, as is the post-storm blight that has taken hold of so many stricken
neighborhoods.42 Housing for displaced families is a critical humanitarian, social,
economic, political and legal problem that will only worsen unless global changes
are put in place. Local, state, and federal government officials must decide:
whether low-income housing will be constructed; whether and how the public
38 THE BROOKINGS INST. METRO. POLICY PROGRAM & GREATER NEW ORLEANS COMMUNITY
DATA CENTER, NUMBER OF ACTIVE TRAVEL TRAILERS, MOBILE HOMES AND PARK MODELS IN Lou-

tbl.18 (Apr. 1, 2008). In July 2006, nearly a year after the storm, 73,214 FEMA trailers were in
use throughout Louisiana. Id. This number has steadily decreased as FEMA has reclaimed the several
hundred square foot trailers. Id. Finally, in May 2008, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control released
evidence that the trailers were toxically contaminated by formaldehyde. Id. By March 21, 2008, 23,393
FEMA trailers remained occupied throughout Louisiana. Id.
39 Id.
40 See Rick Jervis, Tracking Recovery in New Orleans, USA TODAY, Mar. 17, 2008, at 12A; see
also Lizzy Ratner, Homelessness in New Orleans, THE NATION, Feb. 7, 2008, http://www.the
nation.com/doc/20080225/ratner; Desiree Evans, New Orleans' Notorious Homeless Camp Cleared,
FACING SOUTH, July 18, 2008, http://southernstudies.org/2008/07/new-orleans-notorious-homelesscamp.html.
41 Jervis, supra note 40.
42 Press Release, Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, Percent Recovery by Neighborhood (Pre- and Post-K) (Aug. 21, 2008), http://gnocdc.s3.amazonaws.com/media/GNOCDCAug2108.pdf; see also BENCHMARKS FOR BLIGHT, supra note 19.
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schools will be rebuilt and staffed; and what will become of the thousands of
people who, pre-Katrina, had been long-term residents of the now-demolished
federally-subsidized housing projects.
Today, state and federal agencies, the media, and public policy organizations
offer few measures or reportable estimates of how New Orleans will look one,
two, or three decades from now. There are few reported projections of how long
the recovery and rebuilding process will take, or what percentage of the preKatrina population will return to New Orleans. The future of the city and, more
specifically, whether or not families will return, depends on a variety of factors
that are essentially normative measures of social justice. New Orleans is quite
simply on the cusp of a new era; either it will grasp the opportunity to arise and
survive as a vital U.S. metropolis of the twenty-first century, or it will slowly and
painfully continue to decline.4 3
Determining how and when the city's infrastructure-i.e., its levees, roads,
bridges, canals, public transportation system, schools, daycare centers, hospitals,
and housing-will be rebuilt and revitalized is key to this process. To date, government funding for infrastructure rebuilding and recovery, while obligated and
appropriated, has been agonizingly slow in reaching local agencies. 4 4 What types
of jobs and employment are made available to potential residents, as well as what
financial support and social services governments will provide, are all components of the social goals of rebuilding and revitalization. An inadequate pre-Katrina healthcare system was further devastated by the storm, and today a health
care crisis exists in New Orleans. 45 Indeed, it would make little sense and be
counter to humanitarian principles to have displaced residents return to the same
desperate conditions of poverty, unemployment, substandard housing, failed
schools, lack of access to health care, and racial segregation that characterized
pre-Katrina New Orleans.
The dueling dynamics and dialectics of displacement and return are complex
and sensitive. Many of the city's residents deeply loved their city and were com43 See Nicolai Ouroussoff, Reflections: New Orleans and China, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, at
WK1. "But for those with a sense of urban history, the tragedy of New Orleans is not just about
governmental disregard for the welfare of the city's inhabitants. It is about a lost opportunity. All of
the great challenges that confront the 21st - century city-from class, race and environmental issues to
the continuing duel between history and modernity-are crystallized in New Orleans." Id.
44 THREE YEARS AFTER KATRINA, supra note 6, at 14 ("Although FEMA has obligated nearly
$7 billion for local infrastructure repairs and debris removal, just half of those funds has [sic] reached
localities . . . [New] Orleans has received less than 41 percent of its $2 billion obligation.").
45 See Bill Quigley, Feeding 18,000 Families a Month in One Neighborhood: The Right to Return
to New Orleans, THE DISSIDENT VOICE, Feb. 26, 2007, http://www.dissidentvoice.orgFeb07/Quigley

26.htm ("Healthcare is in crisis. The main public healthcare provider, Charity Hospital, which saw
350,000 patient visits a year, remains closed, as do half the hospitals in the city. It is not clear it will
reopen .... Mental health is worse. A report by the World Health organization estimates that serious
and mild to moderate mental illness doubled in the year after Hurricane Katrina among survivors.").
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mitted to it in ways that are largely unique in the American experience. Many
residents remained in New Orleans throughout their lifetimes. Those without resources rarely traveled beyond the state of Louisiana. The people and families
displaced by the storm have the right, and must be enabled, to return to New
Orleans, to rebuild their homes and to live there again, if that is their choice. For
in fact, New Orleans will never truly "recover" as a vital urban center unless and
until its former residents-families from across the entire social, economic and
racial spectrum-can and do return safely to the city, and are concretely supported in their decisions to do so.
Exacerbated by the troubled recovery process, the urban systemic problems of
poverty, homelessness and crime have worsened as residents try to return to New
Orleans. The public housing stock has been largely demolished by federal and
city housing agencies, despite the fact that several of the projects sustained minimal storm damage. 4 6 Some of the projects built during FDR's New Deal Administration of the 1930s had been relatively well-built and sturdy low-rise
developments. 47 Today, there appear to be no concrete plans to replace these
low-income and subsidized public housing units so that former residents can return to decent, affordable urban housing. 4 8 Many evacuees cannot return because
there is scarce affordable housing. Many who have returned are now homeless or
living in squalor, having resorted to squatting in the ruins of former homes. 4 9 As
a result, the urban problems of poverty, drug abuse, and crime are worsening in
post-Katrina New Orleans. Increasingly, the conditions of life for those returning
to New Orleans have had very negative impacts on families, women, the elderly
and disabled, and on the welfare of children.

46 See generally, FederalHousing Response to Katrina: HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 123-25 (2007) (statement of Judith A. Browne-Dianis, Esq., Co-Director, Advancement Project) [hereinafter Statement of Judith A. Browne-Dianis]. A federal lawsuit was filed
in the U.S. District for the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of more than 5000 former residents
of four principal housing projects slated for demolition. Katy Reckdahl, Like a Ton of Bricks, GAMBIT
WEEKLY, Oct. 24, 2006, http://bestofneworleans.com/gyrobase/Content?oid=old%3A37092. Early this
year, the Fifth Circuit affirmed denial of the residents' motion for a preliminary injunction to halt the
demolition. Anderson v. Jackson, No. 07-31138, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1890, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 26,
2009).
47 Ouroussoff, supra note 43 ("A few months ago, the Department of Housing and Urban Development began tearing down thousands of low-income housing units built in the late 1930s and
early '40s, including several low-rise brick apartment blocks in the working-class neighborhood of
Treme that were among the best early examples of public housing in the country.").
48 Statement of Judith A. Browne-Dianis, supra note 46, at 124; see generally Quigley, supra
note 45.
49
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Since their evacuation, the former residents of public housing units have never
been allowed to return to collect their belongings.5 ° The housing projects were
almost immediately fenced off by the housing agencies after Katrina. Former re5
sidents were not even afforded their rights under judicial eviction proceedings. '
The rotted debris of people's lives were left strewn onto the barren lots by the
wrecking balls-a child's doll here, a chest of drawers with clothes spilling out

there, and pots and pans scattered helter-skelter. It is a national disgrace that the
government has destroyed these elements of people's lives with such lack of care
and regard for their homes, families, rights, and human dignity.
Moreover, the Road Home Program (the "Road Home"), Louisiana's major
recovery effort funded by the federal government to compensate underinsured
homeowners for their losses not covered by insurance, has been a dismal failure. 52 So far in Southern Louisiana, about $6.9 billion in federal taxpayer money
has been spent, about $3.3 billion on New Orleans residences, out of a total $9.1
billion authorized by Congress for the state-wide program. 5 3 The Road Home,

the government's largest program to help homeowners rebuild, has not only
failed but has lost the public's confidence as well. The Road Home, begun in June
2006, has been plagued by bureaucratic ineptitude, bungling, and red tape. The

program has been so ineffective in achieving its purpose in a timely manner that
its chief promoter, Katrina-era governor, Democrat Kathleen Blanco, decided
not to seek re-election, effectively ending her political career. 54 By July 2008, the
Road Home had issued cash awards to 114,679 Louisiana homeowners, or 73.5%

of eligible homeowners. However, the pace of granting awards has slowed dramatically, as has the average size of the award.
50 Interview with Sonia Spears, Judge, 1st District Civil Court Orleans Parish, in New Orleans,
La. (May 19, 2008); see also Quigley, supra note 45.
51 Id.
52 See Katy Reckdahl, Report: Road Home Falls Short, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 20, 2008, at National 1. ("[E]normous obstacles blocked the recovery for homeowners, and most Road Home applicants received far less than what they needed to rebuild their homes, [which] affected poor
homeowners the most egregiously." (citing POLICYLINK, A LONG WAY HOME: THE STATE OF HOUSING RECOVERY IN LOUISIANA (2008))); see also After Fanfare,supra note 20.
53 After Fanfare, supra note 20.
54 Id. ("[T]he painfully slow pace of the Road Home's disbursements cost Ms. Blanco her political career, sending her into premature retirement."). See Ed Anderson & Robert Travis Scott, Blanco
Bows Out of Race; Slow Recovery Takes Toll on Governor, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 21, 2007, at National 1 ("Dogged by delays in her hurricane recovery program, dismal poll numbers and pressure
from her own party, Democratic Gov. Kathleen Blanco announced Tuesday that she will not seek a
second term this fall.").
55 THREE YEARS AFTER KATRINA, supra note 6, at 12. The Road Home Program issued awards
at an average of 3972 per month in July 7, 2008, down from a monthly average of 9450 in the latter
half of 2007. Id. The average award to a homeowner had dropped from $72,669 in July 2007 to only
$58,688 in July 2008. Id. At this pace, all funds may not be disbursed before May 2009, and likely will
not be disbursed until October 2009. Id.
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Perhaps all these issues and factors-ineffective and unevenly administered
public initiatives, lack of coordination and leadership, inept and bungled bureaucracies, funds unaccounted for, and stalled and patchy recovery programs-are
warnings and lessons too late to be learned for the effective and humane rebuilding of New Orleans, but perhaps not. History and time will tell. Putting in place
an equitable and effective social justice approach to recovery, as discussed in the
following section, will affect the outcomes in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast.
As discussed above, a key part of securing the future of New Orleans also depends on the relocation and return of its former residents.
What is certain is that these travesties can be avoided by other urban centers
facing disaster. Urban leaders can and should strengthen and empower vulnerable communities, and diligently work towards stemming poverty and revitalizing
blighted neighborhoods. Civic leaders and elected officials can and must protect
against racial bias and segregation before disaster strikes. Finally, urban centers
must engage in emergency preparedness and demand strong federal and local
leadership in promoting and funding such programs. It is not enough for urban
leaders and government officials to agree on the importance of these and other
Katrina Lessons. The lessons must be fully integrated and implemented, and
leaders must lead before and not just after disaster strikes.
C. Pre-Existing Urban Ills Will Exacerbate the Level of
Destruction in Disasters Nationwide
Cities that have vulnerable communities similar to those in New Orleans likely
are as susceptible to future humanitarian disasters as New Orleans was. These
communities are characterized by decades of official neglect, highly concentrated
poverty, urban blight, racial discrimination, disempowerment, segregation, failing
schools, substandard housing, rampant drug abuse, and high crime rates. As
shown by New Orleans, when disaster strikes it is the most unfortunate, disempowered, and vulnerable people who will suffer the greatest infrastructure and
residential damage and loss of life. The most acute harm will be inflicted on children, women and the elderly and disabled. They likely will experience the highest
rates of residential displacement and will have the most difficulties in rebuilding
and achieving recovery.
This is a threshold lesson of Katrina, and urban leaders should address this
warning now. If civic leaders and elected officials allow inner cities to become
high-concentrated poverty areas, segregated by race, then these areas will be
targets for both natural and man-made physical disasters. They not only will be
vulnerable to physical destruction, but also to population displacement and permanent blight. For example, Anacostia, a large section of the District of Columbia, shares many of the characteristics of the pre-Katrina Lower Ninth Ward. It is
the community in the nation's capital most at risk of destruction should a disaster
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occur. Particularly in this era of economic decline and recession, the District of
Columbia and other urban areas need to seriously heed the impact of poverty
and urban blight on the ways in which a disaster can devastate cities. Therefore,
remedying urban blight and poverty along with minimizing the effects of racial
segregation and the legacy of discrimination before disaster hits are the first steps
to averting, or at least mitigating the impact of disaster.
In the case of pre-Katrina New Orleans-a city where most poor communities
existed below sea level-poverty, segregation, official neglect, and inadequate
levees combined with the elements of the "Perfect Storm." The inability, or refusal, of city and state officials and agencies to recognize this reality coupled with
the federal government's blatant failure to build and adequately maintain effective levees, resulted in a tragedy whose impact will be felt for both decades and
generations.
Each at-risk or vulnerable pre-Katrina population-i.e., children, women, families, the elderly, the institutionalized (prisoners, mental patients, nursing home
residents), the chronically ill, the medically fragile and the disabled-was largely
abandoned during the storm. The members of these special populations also have
had the greatest challenges-if they survived at all-in overcoming the storm's
destructive impact. The impact of these multiple phenomena is in part unique to
New Orleans, and in part dangerously applicable to other urban areas.
IH.

TOWARDS AN EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVE SOCIAL JUSTICE
AGENDA FOR RECOVERY AND REMEDIATION OF
KATRINA'S CATASTROPHIC IMPACT

The following points summarize what must be done to support the people of
New Orleans and the Gulf Coast from this point forward in the recovery process.
These factors constitute an equitable and effective social justice agendafor recovery, which is still desperately needed over three years since Katrina. This recovery agenda advances the struggles of New Orleanians in their ongoing challenges
to recover and to rebuild. Foremost among these issues is the uncompromising
need for a strong federal government role in reversing the failures of the recovery
to date. These points speak to the state of affairs in New Orleans more than three
years after Katrina, the urgent need to reverse the failing recovery, as well as the
obligation of government to bring dignity, equality and social justice to all the
people who once made New Orleans their home.
A.

America Must Not Forget and Must Rally Behind Its Disaster Victims

Until Hurricane Gustav swept towards the United States on the third anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, it appeared that America had largely forgotten what
happened in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast in August 2005. Regardless of the
status of our collective Katrina memory on any given day, we must do whatever
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we can to keep the legacy, losses, and needs of the disaster victims alive, current
and compelling. Many residents of New Orleans and other hard-hit areas of the
Gulf Coast feel a deep sense of abandonment and have lost faith in their government. 56 We must not forget the people and communities of New Orleans, as well
as the depth and scope of the destruction, the ineffective, troubled recovery, the
government ineptitude, and the fact that much of the city and Gulf Coast are still
lying in total ruins.
Hurricane Gustav's race toward the Gulf Coast in late August 2008 brought to
light once again Katrina's stark images of physical destruction, displacement and
human suffering, and the failure of the Bush Administration to respond to the
disaster. Until then, and in the absence of ongoing media coverage of Katrina's
aftermath, the American people largely had put out of their minds the horror that
they watched as the events of August 2005 and the drowning of this major U.S.
city unfolded. Gustav and the renewed exposure during the national 2008 Presidential Campaign of the Bush Administration's abandonment and neglect of Katrina's victims showed that many thousands of people are still experiencing the
impact of the disaster.
The Bush Administration's delayed and ineffective response to the Katrina
catastrophe was surely that administration's major domestic policy failure. Today,
the people of New Orleans and many others hope and expect that the new Barack Obama Administration will reverse the failures of the Bush Administration
and its abdication of responsibility to the people of the Gulf Coast. President
Obama has already issued a Katrina-related policy to aggressively rebuild the
region's infrastructure and to initiate a humanitarian approach to the recovery
and rebuilding of New Orleans and the entire region.5 7
56

See generally,

THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NEW ORLEANS THREE YEARS AFrER

20-21 (2008) ("In many ways, New
Orleans residents seem to feel that their nation has let them down in a time of need. They feel ignored
by their elected leaders in Washington, underwhelmed by the financial help provided by the federal
A significant majority are also disapgovernment, and forgotten by their fellow Americans ....
pointed by the federal government in general. Three in four say the federal government has not
provided enough money and other support to the city.").
57 THE WHITE HOUSE, THE AGENDA - ADDITIONAL ISSUES, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
agenda/additional (last visited Mar. 22, 2009) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE AGENDA]. The ObamaBiden Administration Agenda states:
President Obama will keep the broken promises made by President Bush to rebuild New
Orleans and the Gulf Coast. He and Vice President Biden will take steps to ensure that the
federal government will never again allow such catastrophic failures in emergency planning
and response to occur. President Obama swiftly responded to Hurricane Katrina. Citing the
Bush Administration's "unconscionable ineptitude" in responding to Hurricane Katrina,
then-Senator Obama introduced legislation requiring disaster planners to take into account
the specific needs of low-income hurricane victims. Obama visited thousands of Hurricane
survivors in the Houston Convention Center and later took three more trips to the region.
He worked with members of the Congressional Black Caucus to introduce legislation to address the immediate income, employment, business, and housing needs of Gulf Coast comTHE STORM: THE SECOND KAISER POST-KATRINA SURVEY, 2008
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B.

Recovery Is a Matter of Social Justice - Civil and Legal Rights

The recovery of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast is a matter of social justice
and a question of civil and legal rights for the survivors of the storm. The people
of New Orleans and the entire region, after first suffering life-altering devastation, trauma, and loss, are now experiencing a great injustice. Each of us as
Americans is faced with a moral choice and a critical challenge to engage in civic
service to fulfill and protect people's rights, because we can still make a difference. This is a historic turning point for the recovery as to whether it will occur
and in what ways, and whether the recovery will ultimately produce a positive
outcome for the people of New Orleans.
As noted earlier in this Essay, Hurricane Katrina struck indiscriminately by
wreaking destruction upon people of all races, and across the economic spectrum.
However, the failure to evacuate those without means, the delayed response, the
ensuing uneven apartheid-type recovery, and the breaking of the inadequate levees were all elements of man-made disaster. The result has been a different treatment of the "haves" and the "have-nots" of New Orleans. This different
treatment, largely benefiting those with economic resources, has exposed decades
of racial and economic disparities that became obvious to the world during Katrina and the floods.
The result of this apartheid recovery will be a demographically different New
Orleans unless actions are taken to redirect the process. The racial and economic
demographics of New Orleans already have shifted post-Katrina, resulting in a
population that is whiter and less poor. For the first time in decades, this demographic shift is resulting in a majority-white electorate in New Orleans that is
changing the face of elected officials, for example, in the school board and city
council. 58 Many residents who have returned and other observers, myself included, believe that the programs and actions advanced to date appear intended
to keep that new demographic composition in place. Lawyers and other defenders of civil liberties should turn their attention to the defense and protection of
civil and legal rights, such as the voting rights of the city's current and former
residents.
munities. President Barack Obama will partner with the people of the Gulf Coast to rebuild
now, stronger than ever.
Id.
58 Ann M. Simmons, Storms Also Shifted Demographics, Census Finds, L.A. TIMES, June 7,
2006, at A4 ("In the four months following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the population of the New
Orleans metropolitan area became substantially whiter, older and less poor, and it shrank to less than
half its size, according to statistics released today by the Census Bureau."); see also Kevin Chappell,
Racial Makeup Shifts on New Orleans' City Council; Whites Now Majority, JET MAGAZINE, Dec. 17,
2007, at 6 ("In a sign of changing racial demographics in New Orleans, the recent election of a White
to the city council has created the first non-Black majority in the city in more than two decades.").
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C.

Creation of the "Katrina Diaspora" is Unprecedented in Modern U.S.
History, and ItMust Be Acknowledged and Reversed

When Hurricane Katrina hit and the levees broke, over a million people were
instantly forced from their homes and communities. As discussed earlier in this
Essay, New Orleans has far from repopulated to its pre-Katrina numbers.
Thousands of people are still displaced across the nation in the Katrina Diaspora.59 These internally displaced people, forced from their homes in New Orleans and the surrounding parishes, are today in the cities of Atlanta, Dallas,
Memphis, Houston, Fort Worth, and in states as far away as Washington, Wisconsin, and Alaska.6 °
This is an unprecedented displacement of persons within the borders of the
United States due to disaster. Thousands of families have not been able to return
to their communities. If they did return home, many would return to few jobs,
ruined houses, and a stark lack of services in their former communities. Soon,
persons in the Katrina Diaspora will never be able to return. In other words, as
each day and week passes, the possibility of returning becomes more remote.
This story of internal displacement and the creation of the Katrina Diaspora
has not been widely reported by the media, nor has it been seriously acknowledged by the government, politicians or other officials. Just as disturbing, actual
figures of exactly how many persons are displaced, and where they currently reside are generally inaccessible. In fact, these figures may not exist at all. Government agencies, "first responders," and recovery organizations, such as the Red
Cross, evacuated hundreds of thousands of survivors during the chaotic evacuation of the New Orleans Superdome. Yet, no single agency subsequently has
tracked the placement and welfare of these former residents. What is known is
that the population of pre-Katrina New Orleans was just under 500,000 and the
population is just under 250,000 post-Katrina. 61 As discussed in previous sections
of this Essay, government efforts must be undertaken to incentivize and support
the return of displaced former residents, if that is their choice.
D. International Law Guidelines ProtectingKatrina Survivors Compel
Compliance from Federal and Local Government.

International human rights principles are being violated by the United States
government by delaying and denying adequate recovery for thousands of dis59 Jervis & Heath, supra note 17 ("On the cusp of the storms three year anniversaries, more
than 14,000 families remain in FEMA-funded apartments across the Gulf Coast and as far away as
Alaska.").
60 Id.
61

THREE YEARS AFTER KATRINA, supra note 6, at 25. The 2000 census for Orleans Parish was

484,674. Id. In July 2005, just before Katrina, the population was estimated at 453,726; the July 2007
population estimate was 239,124. Id.
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placed evacuees. As noted above, Katrina and the floods created perhaps the
greatest episode of internal displacement of U.S. residents in the nation's history.
A central component of a social justice agenda for recovery of the Gulf Coast
requires the United States government, as well as the Louisiana, Mississippi, and
the New Orleans governments to recognize and follow the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights' Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

(the "Guiding Principles"). Adherence to these international principles would
steer the development of a meaningful post-Katrina response and significantly
help to ensure a safe return home for the displaced.
The Guiding Principles establish internationally recognized protections for
people who are displaced from their homes by armed conflict, generalized violence, or natural or human-induced disasters, 62 such as Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita and the resulting levee breaks. The principles apply to evacuees who have
not crossed an internationally recognized border. These are legal rights based on
humanitarian principles that protect residents from losing the places they traditionally have called home (due to these causes), as well as protect from disaster
profiteering (e.g., no-bid contracting, privatization of recovery services). Under
the Guiding Principles, displaced persons have the right to request and receive
protection and humanitarian assistance from governmental authorities, as well as
the right to voluntarily return or resettle in safety, with dignity.63 Internally displaced persons have a right to such assistance in ways that do not intentionally
discriminate or result in a discriminatory impact.64 Finally, under the Guiding
Principles,persons displaced by Katrina would be entitled to housing for the duration of the displacement, education, and medical services, including mental
health care and social services.6 5
The Katrina evacuees and those still in the Katrina Diasporasurely qualify as
displaced persons under the United Nation's Guiding Principles on Internal Dis-

placement. Indeed, these people have been displaced from their homes by a disaster and they have not migrated across international borders. Moreover, under the
Guiding Principles, national governments, not local, have the primary duty to
provide protection and humanitarian assistance to people who are displaced by a
natural or man-made disaster. 66 No comprehensive plan or program exists today
in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast to accomplish these objectives.
In failing to recognize and achieve these goals, the federal government, specifically the Bush Administration, generally violated these international human
62 Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998) [hereinafter Guiding
Principles].

63
64

65
66

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at Principles 3, 25, 28.
at Principles 4, 18, 24.

at Principles 18, 19, 23, 28.
at Principles 3, 25, 29.
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rights principles. The federal government allocated billions of dollars in recovery
funds to Louisiana and Mississippi, to be administered by local recovery agencies;
however a significant portion of these funds have yet to be distributed. 67 Moreover, the federal government generally has not directly administered recovery and
rebuilding programs, other than the botched FEMA trailer program. It has not
ensured that affordable housing, health care and adequate employment were
made available to storm-displaced persons. For the most part, the federal government is not bringing displaced persons, particularly those still in the Katrina Diaspora, home to New Orleans.
Instead, the federal government has chosen to only apply the restrictive and
out-dated federal Robert T. Stafford Act.6 8 This federal law: places the primary
responsibility for disaster recovery on the states; denies a legal right of assistance
to individuals; and leaves the provision of housing and other services to the discretion of local governments. 69 By incorporating the Guiding Principles into U.S.
disaster law (including amendments to the Stafford Act), the U.S. government
would be taking important steps to ensure that those impacted by future disasters
will not experience the trauma, long-term displacement, and suffering of Katrina
70
victims.
E. A Federal "New Deal" Recovery Model Is Desperately Needed to
Achieve Social Justice for Katrina Survivors
As noted throughout this Essay, the recovery of New Orleans and the Gulf
Coast is far from complete. It has occurred inequitably, in fits and starts, and has
been mired in bureaucratic red tape and serious levels of incompetence and unaccountability. The recovery to date has been marred by an increasingly diminished
federal presence and by huge mistakes, such as the issuance of the toxic FEMA
trailers. In addition, millions of dollars in recovery funds are unaccounted for,
largely due to mismanagement of funds that have been funneled to private con67 THREE YEARS AFTER KATRINA, supra note 6, at 14 ("Although FEMA has obligated nearly
$7 billion for local infrastructure repairs and debris removal, just half of those funds has reached
localities . . . Orleans [Parrish] has received less than 41 percent of its $2 billion obligation."); see also
After Fanfare, supra note 20.
68 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5191-5193
(2006).
69 Id.
70 For an in-depth discussion of the Guiding Principlesand Katrina's victims see CHRIS KROMM
& SUE STURGIS, INST. FOR SOUTHERN STUDIES, HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES
ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: A GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE ON A NATIONAL DISASTER

(Jan. 2008), available at http://www.southernstudies.org/ISSKatrinaHumanRightsJan08.pdf. Also, Advocates for Environmental Human Rights, a New Orleans public interest law firm co-directed by
attorneys Monique Harden and Nathalie Walker, discusses the applicability of the Guiding Principles
to internally displaced Gulf Coast hurricane survivors. EHumanRights.org, U.S. Disaster Response
Law vs. Human Rights Standard on Internal Displacement, http://www.ehumanrights.org/ourworkresidentsUSDRLvHRS.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).

UNIVERSITY OF THE DisTRicT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

tractors by the Bush Administration. 71 Now, over three years after the storm,
many people see that the "recovery" is an American domestic policy failure. The
much-publicized Road Home Program, intended to be the Cadillac recovery program for former Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco's administration, in partnership with the federal government, has been mired in red tape and essentially
deemed ineffective.72 Katrina survivors have been abandoned in large measure
by the local, state and federal governments.
Given the amount of time since the disaster hit, the recovery and rebuilding of
New Orleans could have, and should have, been already substantially completed.
This failure has resulted, in large part, from the lack of federal governmental
political will, leadership and funding, and the lack of a unified plan. It is particularly unacceptable that the billions of federal dollars, material resources, and
manpower that have funded the invasion, occupation, and war in Iraq, could have
been put to use in rebuilding the entire Gulf Coast region by now. Every public
school in New Orleans should have been cleaned out, rebuilt, and reopened.
Every library, cultural center, fire station, jail, police station, and every home
should have been rebuilt and even improved from what it was pre-Katrina.
There is an immediate and compelling need for federal leadership, funding and
intervention in order to undertake a meaningful and equitable recovery, and to
effectively rebuild the city of New Orleans, the state of Louisiana and the entire
region. This reinvigorated recovery must be based on: values of fairness and social justice; the right of all to live in a safe, healthy, and productive environment;
and the restoration of historic communities. Quite simply, it is shocking that in
America, arguably one of the most powerful and wealthiest nations, a city and an
entire region would remain disaster-blighted and largely in ruins, years after a
major hurricane.
What is needed is a powerful federal agency approach such as the New Deal.
Such an approach would rebuild the aging and inadequate infrastructure of highways, bridges, canals, and levees, while also creating desperately needed jobs. A
New Deal type of recovery would also cut through the bureaucratic mire, the
myriad of conflicts among local government agencies and committees, and the
71 Eric Lipton, FEMA is Eager to Show It Learned From Katrina, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2008, at
All ("Auditors estimate that waste and abuse cost the government more than $1 billion after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005."); see also H.R. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM - MINORITY STAFF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION, REPORT ON WASTE, FRAUD AND ABUSE IN HURRICANE KATRINA
CONTRACTS

3 (Aug. 2006), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20060824110705-30132.

pdf ("In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Bush Administration turned to private contractors
to provide relief and recovery services worth billions of dollars. Now, one year later, it is apparent
that taxpayers and the residents of the Gulf Coast are paying a steep price for the failure to stop
waste, fraud and abuse in federal contracting .... The report identifies 19 Katrina contracts, collectively worth $8.75 billion, that have experienced significant overcharges, wasteful spending, or
mismanagement.").
72 After Fanfare, supra note 20.
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inaction and fiscal abuse of these various agencies. Congressional oversight and
the new Barack Obama Administration must eliminate the widespread use of nobid private contractors. New federal initiatives promoting civic engagement and
service programs should lessen and limit the reliance on the "faith-based" volunteer initiatives which have been at the center of the Bush Administration's strategy in the Gulf Coast. Several legislative initiatives related to the Katrina
recovery that were introduced in Congress, but not supported by the Bush Administration, should now be moved forward. The Gulf Coast Civic Works Act
would create at least 100,000 jobs for residents and evacuees by rebuilding their
communities and the region's infrastructure. 73 The Gulf Coast Hurricane Housing Recovery Act of 2007 would authorize the federal Housing and Urban Development agency to administer rebuilding of housing for low-income hurricane
survivors throughout the Gulf Coast. 74 Indeed, the new Barack Obama Administration stands poised to provide the national, executive leadership necessary to
75
carry out these federal initiatives, among others.
A federal model of recovery would ensure that the thousands of displaced
residents who remain in the Katrina Diasporacan return safely home with dignity
if they so choose. Such a recovery model, properly administered and funded,
could rebuild homes, as well as the necessary urban infrastructure. It would also
rebuild schools, medical facilities, fire stations, jobs, libraries, and everything else
an American community should provide for its residents. A New Deal model
creating a federal administrative agency approach to rebuilding New Orleans and
the Gulf Coast could turn around the current situation. In short, a strong, federal
New Deal-type approach could put the unemployed to work, re-energize recovery efforts and create the national political will to ensure a fair and meaningful
recovery to this stricken major city-a vital component of our nation's heritage,
culture, and economy.
F. Rebuild the Levees and Restore the Wetlands
Looking at the Lower Ninth Ward after Katrina, one must wonder how such
widespread and prolonged devastation could exist in America. Appearing like
the aftermath of a war-time carpet bombing, the Lower Ninth Ward visually de73 Gulf Coast Civic Works Act, H.R. 4048, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). This legislation would
establish the Gulf Coast Recovery Authority, which would (1) administer a Gulf Coast Civic Works
Project that employs a minimum of 100,000 Gulf Coast region residents and evacuees for public works
projects to rebuild, sustain, and develop the Gulf Coast region; (2) establish job training programs and
apprenticeships, to recruit and train qualified workers, including from the Gulf Coast region, for specific vacancies in recovery, rebuilding, and development projects; and (3) ensure that all workers are
paid wages at not less than the prevailing locality rate. Id. §§ 201-206.
74 Gulf Coast Hurricane Housing Recovery Act, H.R. 1227, 110th Cong. § 101(a) (1st Sess.
2007). This measure was referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs in
March 2007. 153 CONG. REC. S3705 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 2007).
75 WHITE HOUSE AGENDA, supra note 57.
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fies hope. Under the shadow of the once-breached but now-temporarily-patched
levee holding back the waters of the Industrial Canal, the area stands as a symbol
of how the U.S. government has failed its own people. Today the observer of this
area sees vast acres of wasteland with only an occasional set of front stoop steps
visible where a home had once stood. Here, Katrina's catastrophic storm surge
breached the levee's walls and hundreds of Lower Ninth Ward residents
drowned. Now, the patched wall of the still inadequate levee stands as a marker
of this tragedy. A public debate has ensued as to whether it defies logic to attempt home rebuilding in the shadow of the breached levees, unless and until the
levees are adequately rebuilt to withstand another catastrophic storm.
To date, the levees of New Orleans have been patched and reinforced, but not
substantially rebuilt to withstand hurricanes at the level of Katrina and greater.
Reports indicate that only about 20% of the levee system rebuilding project has
been completed.7 6 So far, only $2 billion of the $13 billion massive levee rebuilding and construction project has been expended. 77 The reinforcing and patchwork completed would not protect the city from another major hurricane. 78 The
fact that the patched levee system withstood the surges of Hurricane Gustav, a
significantly weaker storm than Katrina, was hailed as a victory. However, this
was a hollow gain and temporary result that only affirmed what experts already
knew. Suddenly, with the levee system back in the news as Hurricane Gustav
bore down on the Gulf Coast and New Orleans, the failure of local and federal
governments to rebuild the system to withstand a 100-year storm like Gustav, let
alone a 397-year storm as Hurricane Katrina, was exposed.7 9
The reality is that the levee system once built to protect New Orleans-a system that failed tragically after Katrina hit the city-is still not sufficient to protect
against a Category 4 or Category 5 hurricane. This leaves the city vulnerable to
major flooding if such a strong hurricane occurs. 80 After Katrina struck and the
levees broke, unleashing the massive deadly floods into the city, an Army Corps
of Engineers study reported that the levee walls had been inadequately designed
and that political decisions had led to failures to correct the system before disaster hit.81 The federal Army Corps of Engineers, which has joint responsibility
with the local government to build and maintain these levees, has reported that it
76 Adam Nossiter & Shaila Dewan, In New Orleans, Many Opt to Flee as Storm Grows, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2008, at Al, A24.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Adam Nossiter, New Orleans Emptied as Coast Bracesfor Landfall Today, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
1, 2008, at Al.
80 Lipton, supra note 71 (quoting Jane Bullock, former FEMA chief of staff, "People knew
what had to be done to bring the levees up to the point that they could protect the city. But it has not
happened.").
81 Alan Levin, Shored-up System Appears to Withstand the Surge, USA TODAY, Sept. 3, 2008, at
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will not be able to complete the enormous rebuilding project necessary to protect
against such future massive storms until the year 2011.82 The cost of the total
project could be as high as $15 billion.83 Meanwhile, improvements to the levee
84
system, while patchy and significantly incomplete, are ongoing.
The wetlands that protected the ground from disappearing further below sea
level have not been restored since Katrina. They took another direct hit when
Hurricane Gustav hit the miles of natural cypress marshes sitting in its path, marshes which may now be irrevocably damaged.8 5 These coastal wetlands and sandy
barrier islands are buffers against hurricanes. Without the wetland barriers and
marshes, Louisiana's coastline, which includes miles of oil pipelines and busy
ports, sits dangerously exposed and unprotected.8 6
Coastal land loss throughout the Gulf Coast is a growing and critically important aspect of the environmental crisis in the region, leaving the area increasingly
exposed to hurricanes, floods, and tropical storms. The land loss in Louisiana
alone has amounted to a land mass the size of the state of Delaware. 87 This has
been caused by both global climate change and the lack of federal regulation of
area industries, most notably the oil and energy industies.88
These are the essential infrastructures and environmental resources that must
be rebuilt and bolstered now, in order to protect recovering communities in this
highly-vulnerable area against future natural disasters. With global climate
change leading to more active hurricane seasons and to storms that are more
frequent, as well as more extreme in force and destruction, the need to address
these issues is critically important. The issues of climate change and natural erosion of these protective barriers must be addressed by government leaders and
82 Two Million Flee, supra note 10 (" 'You can't just build a levee overnight,' said Col. Al Lee,
the commander for the New Orleans district for the corps ....
But the higher level of protection
designed to withstand serious flooding will not be complete until 2011."); see also THREE YEARS
AFTER KATRINA, supra note 6, at 14 ("The city's vulnerability to hurricane flooding has been reduced
according to recent models developed by an Army Corps of Engineers task force. Improvements to
the Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk Reduction System, which is intended to protect the region
from storm surge that has a I percent chance of occurring any given year, are ongoing and scheduled
to be completed in 2011.").
83 Levin, supra note 81.
84

THREE YEARS AFTER KATRINA, supra note 6, at 23 ("Improvements made to date on the

levee system include construction of outflow canal gates, rebuilding levees, scour protection, transition armoring, reinforcement of floodwalls and safe house construction.").
85 Rick Jervis, La. Assesses Storm Damage to its Protective Wetlands, USA TODAY, Sept. 2,
2008, at 4A.
86 Id.
87 Courtney Howell, Director and Co-Founder, Bayou Grace Community Services (La.), Address at the Policy Briefing and Forum: The Gulf Coast and the New Administration: An Agenda for
the First 100 Days (Sept. 15, 2008).
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Id.
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decision-makers as matters requiring sustained, comprehensive, and intelligent
policymaking.
In New Orleans and throughout the Gulf Coast, recovery requires a partnership between responsible environmentalism, social justice advocacy, and protection of individual rights. The triumvirate of climate change, poverty, and erosion
of natural protections in the Gulf Coast region must be addressed together. The
results hopefully will lead to revitalization and regrowth of the environment, and
to recovery of the area's urban centers and rural communities. This should be
accomplished in ways that also responsibly contain the natural forces that
threaten vast residential areas and the communities built below sea level that
remain at great risk throughout the Gulf Coast.
CONCLUSION

The people of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast are Americans and must be
supported by the federal government. Despite the suffering, loss, trauma, and
displacement which they have endured, the courageous and resilient people of
this devastated area continue to take on the enormous challenges of life in postKatrina New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. They deserve recognition for their resilience and spirit to rebuild, recover, and return to their homes. And they deserve the full and compassionate support of their government, as well as each of
us, in achieving these goals and rebuilding their lives.
Though immensely important, bearing witness to the tragedy, trauma, and
human loss caused by Katrina is quite simply not enough. Knowing what we now
know about the causes, the damage, and the responses to Katrina, we must become a part of the recovery, even if from afar. We should be alert and, if we can,
answer the call to service and help advance a social justice agenda for recovery
and rebuilding. While we must vigorously hold the local, state, and federal governments accountable, we each also can play a vital role in supporting the survivors, helping them to return to New Orleans, if they choose to do so, to rebuild
their homes and lives.
To accomplish this we must embrace the lessons of Katrina, many of which
have been discussed in this Essay. Key to this is the understanding that recovery
is more than clearing debris and rebuilding homes and schools. Equitable and
inclusive recovery also requires the political and public will to take on the economic and racial disparities, as well as the environmental challenges, that have
plagued New Orleans for decades. In other words, recovery should amount to an
urban renewal for this severely wounded city that allows it to evolve into a modern and model metropolis for the twenty-first century.
Indeed, Hurricane Katrina continues to provide each of us with a focal point
upon which our individual and collective attention can be turned to learn about
core notions of human compassion and social justice, as well as the responsibility
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and accountability of government-particularly in times of crisis and disaster.
The appearance of Hurricane Gustav on the third anniversary of Katrina and the
subsequent appearance of Hurricane Ike were chilling reminders of the need to
turn our attention and efforts to the people and infrastructure of this vulnerable
area of our nation. The Barack Obama Administration now holds the vast potential of turning the hopes and expectations of the people of New Orleans and the
Gulf Coast towards a genuinely changed reality-a renewed and reenergized recovery. Our engagement, both individually and collectively, is essential to achieving this change.

